We present a computational neural network model of recognition memory based on the biological structures of the hippocampus and medial temporal lobe cortex (MTLC), which perform complementary learning functions. The hippocampal component of the model contributes to recognition by recalling specific studied details. MTLC can not support recall, but it is possible to extract a scalar familiarity signal from MTLC that tracks how well the test item matches studied items. We present simulations that establish key qualitative differences in the operating characteristics of the hippocampal recall and MTLC familiarity signals, and we identify several manipulations (e.g., target-lure similarity, interference) that differentially affect the two signals. We also use the model to address the stochastic relationship between recall and familiarity (i.e., are they independent), and the effects of partial vs. complete hippocampal lesions on recognition.
Introduction
Memory can be subdivided according to functional categories (e.g., declarative vs. procedural memory; Squire, 1992b; Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993) , and according to neural structures (e.g., hippocampallydependent vs. non-hippocampally-dependent forms of memory). Various attempts have been made to align these functional and neural levels of analysis; for example, Squire (1992b) and others have argued that declarative memory depends on the medial temporal lobe, whereas procedural memory depends on other cortical and subcortical structures. Recently, we and our colleagues have set forth a computationally explicit theory of how hippocampus and neocortex contribute to learning and memory (the Complementary Learning Systems model; McClelland, McNaughton, & O'Reilly, 1995) . In this paper, we advance the Complementary Learning Systems model by using it to provide a comprehensive treatment of recognition memory performance.
In the Introduction, we describe two questions that have proved challenging for math modeling and cognitive neuroscience approaches to recognition, respectively: In the math modeling literature, there has been considerable controversy regarding how to characterize the contribution of recall (vs. familiarity) to recognition memory; in the cognitive neuroscience literature, researchers have debated how the hippocampus (vs. medial temporal lobe cortex) contributes to recognition. Then, we show how our modeling approach, which is jointly constrained by behavioral and neuroscientific data, can help resolve these controversies
Dual-Process Controversies
Recognition memory refers to the process of identifying stimuli or situations as having been experienced before, for example when you recognize a person you know in a crowd of strangers. Recognition can be compared with various forms of recall memory where specific content information is retrieved from memory and produced as a response; recognition does not require recall of specific details (e.g., one can recognize a person as being familiar without being able to recall who exactly they are or where you know them from). Nevertheless, recognition can certainly benefit from recall of specific information -if you can recall that the person you recognized at the supermarket is in fact your veterinarian, that reinforces your feeling that you actually do know this person. Theories that posit that recognition is supported by specific recall as well as nonspecific feelings of familiarity are called dual-process theories (see Yonelinas, 2002 for a thorough review of these theories).
While it is obvious that recall can (in principle) contribute to recognition judgments, the notion that recall routinely contributes to item recognition performance is quite controversial. Practically all extant math models of recognition consist of a unitary familiarity process that indexes in a holistic fashion the "global match" between the test probe and all of the items stored in memory (e.g., Hintzman, 1988; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Humphreys, Bain, & Pike, 1989) . These familiarity-only models can explain a very wide range of recognition findings (for reviews, see Clark & Gronlund, 1996; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1992; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2000) -even findings, that at first glance, appear to require a recall process (see, e.g., McClelland & Chappell, 1998) . Furthermore, the relatively small number of findings that can not be explained using standard global matching models tend to come from specialized paradigms like Jacoby's process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991; see Ratcliff, Van Zandt, & McKoon, 1995 for discussion of when global matching models can and can not account for process-dissociation data). As such, it is always possible to treat these findings as special cases that have little relevance to performance on standard item-recognition tests.
Another issue that has hindered the acceptance of dual-process models is the difficulty inherent in measuring the separate contributions of recall and familiarity. Several techniques has been devised for quantitatively estimating how recall and familiarity are contributing to recognition performance (ROC analysis, independence remember-know, and process dissociation; see Yonelinas, 2001b Yonelinas, , 2002 for review and discussion), but all of these techniques rely on a core set of controversial assumptions; for example, they all assume that recall and familiarity are stochastically independent. There are reasons to believe that the independence assumption may not always be valid (see, e.g., Curran & Hintzman, 1995) . Furthermore, there is no way to test this assumption using behavioral data alone because of chicken-and-egg problems (i.e., one needs to measure familiarity to assess its independence from recall, but one needs to assume independence to measure familiarity).
These chicken-and-egg problems have led to a rift between math modelers and other memory researchers. On the empirical side, there is now a vast body of data on recall and familiarity, gathered using measurement techniques that assume (among other things) independence -these data could potentially be used to constrain dualprocess models. However, on the theoretical side, modelers are not making use of these data because of reasonable concerns about the validity of the assumptions used to collect these data, and because single-process models have been quite successful at explaining recognition data (so why bother with more complex dual-process mod- hippocampus. Medial temporal lobe cortex serves as the interface between neocortex and the hippocampus. Medial temporal lobe cortex is located at the very top of the cortical processing hierarchy -it receives highly processed outputs of domain-specific cortical modules, integrates these outputs, and passes them on to the hippocampus; it also receives output from the hippocampus, and passes this activation back to domainspecific cortical modules via feedback connections. els). To resolve this impasse, we need some other source of evidence that we can use to specify the properties of recall and familiarity, other than the aforementioned measurement techniques.
Cognitive Neuroscience Approaches to Recognition Memory
Just as controversies exist in the math modeling literature regarding the contribution of recall to recognition memory, parallel controversies exist in the cognitive neuroscience literature regarding the contribution of the hippocampus to recognition memory.
Researchers have long known that the medial temporal region of the brain is important for recognition memory. Patients with medial temporal lobe lesions encompassing both the hippocampus and the medial temporal lobe cortices (perirhinal, entorhinal, and parahippocampal cortices, which we refer to jointly as MTLC) typically show impaired recall and recognition but intact performance on other memory tests (e.g., perceptual priming, skill learning; see Squire, 1992a for a review).
The finding of impaired recall and recognition in medial temporal amnesics is the basis for several influential taxonomies of memory. Most prominently, Squire, Eichenbaum, Cohen, and others have argued that the medial temporal lobes implement a declarative memory system, which supports recall and recognition, and that other brain structures support procedural memory (e.g., perceptual priming, motor skill learning; Squire, 1992b Squire, , 1987 Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Cohen, Poldrack, & Eichenbaum, 1997; Eichenbaum, 2000) . Researchers have argued that the medial temporal region is important for declarative memory because it is located at the top of the cortical hierarchy and therefore is ideally positioned to associate aspects of the current episode that are being processed in domain-specific cortical modules (e.g., Mishkin, Suzuki, Gadian, & Vargha-Khadem, 1997; Mishkin, Vargha-Khadem, & Gadian, 1998) . See Figure 1 for a schematic diagram of how hippocampus, MTLC, and neocortex are connected.
While the basic declarative memory framework is widely accepted, attempts to tease apart the contributions of different medial temporal structures have been more controversial. There is widespread agreement that the hippocampus is critical for recall -focal hippocampal lesions lead to severely impaired recall performance. However, the data are much less clear regarding effects of focal hippocampal damage on recognition. Some studies have found roughly equal impairments in recall and recognition (e.g., Manns & Squire, 1999; Rempel-Clower, Zola, & Amaral, 1996; Zola-Morgan, Squire, & Amaral, 1986; Reed, Hamann, Stefanacci, & Squire, 1997) , whereas other studies have found relatively spared recognition after focal hippocampal lesions (e.g., Vargha-Khadem, Gadian, Watkins, Connelly, Van Paesschen, & Mishkin, 1997; Holdstock, Mayes, Roberts, Cezayirli, Isaac, O'Reilly, & Norman, 2002; Mayes, Holdstock, Isaac, Hunkin, & Roberts, 2002) . The monkey literature parallels the human literature -some studies have found relatively intact recognition (indexed using the delayed nonmatchto-sample test) following focal hippocampal damage (e.g., Murray & Mishkin, 1998) whereas others have found impaired recognition (e.g., Zola, Squire, Teng, Sefanacci, Buffalo, & Clark, 2000; Beason-Held, Rosene, Killiany, & Moss, 1999) . Spared recognition following hippocampal lesions depends critically on MTLCwhereas recognition is sometimes spared by focal hippocampal lesions, it is never spared after lesions that encompass both MTLC and the hippocampus (e.g., Aggleton & Shaw, 1996) . Aggleton and Brown (1999) have tried to frame the difference between hippocampal and cortical contributions in terms of dual-process models of recognition. According to this view:
The hippocampus supports recall.
The MTLC can support some degree of (familiaritybased) recognition on its own. This framework captures, at a gross level, how hippocampal damage affects memory, but it is too vague to be useful in explaining the considerable variability that exists across patients and tests in how hippocampal damage affects recognition. Just as some hippocampal patients show more of a recognition deficit than others, some studies have found (within individual patients) greater impairment on some recognition tests than others (e.g., Holdstock et al., 2002) . In the absence of further specification of the hippocampal contribution (and how it differs from the contribution of MTLC), it is not possible to proactively determine whether recognition will be impaired or spared in a particular patient/test.
Aggleton & Brown attempt to flesh out their theory by arguing that MTLC familiarity can support recognition of individual items, but memory for new associations between items depends on hippocampal recall Eichenbaum, Otto, & Cohen, 1994 make similar claims). This view implies that item recognition should be intact but the ability to form new associations should be impaired after focal hippocampal damage. However, Andrew Mayes and colleagues have found that hippocampally-lesioned patient YR, who shows intact performance on some item recognition tests (e.g., Mayes et al., 2002) , shows impaired performance on other item recognition tests (e.g., Holdstock et al., 2002) , and spared performance on some tests that require participants to associate previously unrelated stimuli (e.g., the words "window" and "reason"; Mayes, Isaac, Downes, Holdstock, Hunkin, Montaldi, MacDonald, Cezayirli, & Roberts, 2001 ).
In summary: It is becoming increasingly evident that the effects of hippocampal damage are complex. There appears to be some functional specialization in the medial temporal lobe, but the simple dichotomies that have been proposed to explain this specialization are either too vague (recall vs. familiarity) or they are inconsistent with recently acquired data (item memory vs. memory for new associations).
Summary: Combining the Approaches
What should be clear at this point is that the math modeling and cognitive neuroscience approaches to recognition memory would greatly benefit from increased crosstalk: Math modeling approaches need a new source of constraints before they can fully explore how recall contributes to recognition; and cognitive neuroscience approaches need a new, more mechanistically sophisticated vocabulary for talking about the roles of different brain structures in order to adequately characterize differences in how MTLC vs. hippocampus contribute to recognition.
The goal of our research is to achieve a synthesis of these two approaches, by constructing a computational model of recognition memory in which there is a transparent mapping between different parts of the model and different subregions of hippocampus and MTLC. This mapping makes it possible to address neuroscientific findings using the model. For example, to predict the effects of a particular kind of hippocampal lesion, we can "lesion" the corresponding region of the model. By bringing a wide range of constraints -both purely behavioral and neuroscientific -to bear on a common set of mechanisms, we hope to achieve a more detailed understanding of how recognition memory works. Our model falls clearly in the dual-process tradition, insofar as we posit that the hippocampus and MTLC contribute signals with distinct properties to recognition memory. The key, differentiating property of our model is that -in our model -differences in the two signals are grounded in architectural differences between the hippocampus and MTLC; because most of these architectural differences fall along a continuum, it follows that differences in the two signals will be more nuanced than the dichotomies ("item vs. associative") discussed above.
Precis of Modeling Work
In this section, we summarize the major claims of the paper, highlighted in bold font, with pointers to locations in the main text where these issues are discussed in greater detail.
Complementary Learning Systems
The hippocampus is specialized for rapidly memorizing specific events.
The neocortex is specialized for slowly learning about the statistical regularities of the environment. McClelland et al., 1995) . According to this framework, the two goals of memorizing specific events and learning about statistical regularities are in direct conflict when implemented in neural networks; thus, to avoid making a tradeoff, we have evolved specialized neural systems for performing these tasks (see Marr, 1971; O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Sherry & Schacter, 1987 for similar ideas, and Carpenter & Grossberg, 1993 for a contrasting perspective).
These are the central claims of the Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) framework (O'
The hippocampus assigns distinct (pattern separated) representations to stimuli, thereby allowing it to learn rapidly without suffering catastrophic interference.
In contrast, cortex assigns similar representations to similar stimuli; use of overlapping representations allows cortex to represent the shared structure of events, and therefore makes it possible for cortex to generalize to novel stimuli as a function of their similarity to previously encountered stimuli.
A Dual-Process Model of Recognition
We have developed hippocampal and neocortical models that incorporate key aspects of the biology of these structures, and instantiate the complementary learning systems principles outlined above McClelland et al., 1995; O'Reilly & McClelland, 1994; O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000; O'Reilly, Norman, & McClelland, 1998 -However, the neocortex can not support recall of details from specific events, owing to its relatively low learning rate and its inability to sufficiently differentiate the representations of different events.
-Familiarity is measured by the activity of the top most active units, though other measures are possible and we have explored some of them, with similar results (see also Alternate Dependent Measures, p. 41).
The hippocampus supports recall of previously encountered stimuli. When stimuli are presented at study, the hippocampus assigns relatively nonoverlapping (pattern-separated) representations to these items in region CA3. Active units in CA3 are linked to one another, and to a copy of the input pattern (via region CA1). At test, presentation of a partial version of a studied pattern leads to reconstruction (pattern completion) of the original CA3 representation and, through this, reconstruction of the entire studied pattern on the output layer (see The Hippocampal Model, p. 12).
-The hippocampal model is applied to recognition by computing the degree of match between retrieved information and the recall cue, minus the amount of mismatch.
Recall of matching information is evidence that the cue was studied, and recall of information that mismatches the retrieval cue is evidence that the cue was not studied.
Part I: Basic Network Properties
The hippocampal and neocortical signals have distinct operating characteristics. This difference is largely due to differences in the two networks' ability to carry out pattern separation (see Simulation 1: Pattern Separation, p. 15, and Simulation 2: Nature of the Underlying Distributions, p. 15).
-MTLC familiarity functions as a standard signal detection process. The familiarity distributions for studied items and lures are Gaussian and overlap extensively. The distributions overlap because the representations of studied items and lures overlap in MTLC. Some lures, by chance, have representations that overlap very strongly with the representations of studied items in MTLC and -as a result -these lures trigger a strong familiarity signal. -In contrast, the hippocampal recall signal is more diagnostic: Studied items sometimes trigger strong matching recall, but most lures do not trigger any hippocampal recall because of the hippocampus' tendency to assign distinct representations to stimuli (regardless of similarity). As such, high levels of matching recall strongly indicate that an item was studied.
¡
There are boundary conditions on the diagnosticity of the hippocampal recall signal. When the average amount of of overlap between stimuli is high, hippocampal pattern separation mechanisms break down, resulting in strong recall of shared, prototypical features (even in response to lures) and poor recall of features that are unique to particular studied items.
The difference in operating characteristics is most evident on yes-no related lure recognition tests, where lures are similar to studied items, but studied items are dissimilar to one another. The hippocampus strongly outperforms cortex on these tests (see Simulation 3: YN Related Lure Simulations, p. 17).
-As target-lure similarity increases, lure familiarity increases steadily, but (up to a point) hippocampal pattern separation works to keep lure recall at floor.
-Very similar lures trigger recall, but when this happens the lure can often be rejected due to mismatch between retrieved information and the recall cue. For example, if a participant studies "rats" and is tested with "rat", they might recall having studied "rats" (and reject "rat" on this basis).
On related lure recognition tests, the presence of any mismatching recall is highly diagnostic of the item being a lure. As such, we posit that participants pursue a recall-to-reject strategy on such tests, whereby items are given a confident "new" response if they trigger any mismatching recall.
In the Sources of Variability section (p. 18) we discuss different kinds of variability (e.g., variability due to random initial weight settings, encoding variability) and their implications for recognition performance.
Part II: Applications to Behavioral Phenomena
The effects of target-lure similarity on the two models interact with test format (yes-no versus forced-choice) (see Simulation 4: Lure Relatedness and Test Format Interactions, p. 20) .
The hippocampal advantage for related lures (observed with "yes-no" tests, as discussed above) is mitigated by giving participants a forced choice between studied items and corresponding related lures at test (i.e., test A vs. A', B vs. B', where A' and B' are lures related to A and B, respectively; p. 20) .
-Cortical performance benefits from the high degree of covariance in the familiarity scores triggered by studied items and corresponding related lures, which makes small familiarity differences highly reliable. The hippocampal model outperforms the cortical model on yes-no associative recognition tests. As in the related lure simulations, the hippocampal advantage is due to hippocampal pattern separation, and the hippocampus' ability to carry out recall-toreject.
-Even though the cortical model is worse at associative recognition than the hippocampus, the cortical model still performs well above chance. This finding shows that our cortical model has some (albeit reduced) sensitivity to whether items occurred together at study. This contrasts with other models (e.g., Hippocampally-and cortically-driven recognition can be differentially affected by interference manipulations: Increasing list strength impairs discrimination of studied items and lures in the hippocampal model, but does not impair discrimination based on MTLC familiarity. The list strength paradigm measures how repeated study of a set of interference items affects participants' ability to discriminate between nonstrengthened (but studied) target items and lures (see Simulation 6: Interference and List Strength, p. 26).
In both models, the overall effect of interference is to decrease weights to discriminative features of studied items and lures, and to increase weights to prototypical features (which are shared by a high proportion of items in the item set).
The hippocampal model predicts a list strength effect because increasing list strength reduces recall of discriminative features of studied items, and lure recall is already at floor. Increasing list strength therefore has the effect of pushing the studied and lure recall distributions together (reducing discriminability).
The neocortical model predicts a null list strength effect because the familiarity signal triggered by lures has room to decrease as a function of interference. Increasing list strength reduces responding to (the discriminative features of) both studied items and lures, but the average difference in studied and lure familiarity does not decrease. As such, discriminability does not suffer.
-In the neocortical model, lure familiarity initially decreases more than studied-item familiarity as a function of list strength, so the studied-lure gap in familiarity actually widens slightly with increasing interference.
-The widening of the studied-lure gap can be explained in terms of differentiationstudying an item makes its representation overlap less with the representations of other, interfering items . As such, studied items suffer less interference than lures.
-There are limits on the null list strength effect for MTLC familiarity. With high levels of interference item strengthening and/or high input overlap, the neocortical model's sensitivity to discriminative features of studied items and lures approaches floor, and the studied and lure familiarity distributions start to converge (resulting in decreased discriminability).
Data from two recent list strength experiments provide support for the model's prediction that list strength should affect recall-based discrimination but not familiarity-based discrimination (Norman, in press) (see Testing the Model's Predictions, p. 29).
We also discuss ways of modifying the learning rule to accommodate the finding that increasing list length (i.e., adding new items to the study list) hurts recognition sensitivity more than increasing list strength (Murnane & Shiffrin, 1991a; see List Length Effects, p. 31) .
The extent to which the neocortical and hippocampal recognition signals are correlated varies in different conditions. These issues are explored using a more realistic "combined model" where the cortical network responsible for computing familiarity serves as the input to the hippocampal network (see Simulation 7: The Combined Model and the Independence Assumption, p. 32).
Variability in how well items are learned at study (encoding variability) bolsters the correlation between recall and familiarity signals, as was postulated by Curran and Hintzman (1995) and others.
Increasing interference reduces the recallfamiliarity correlation for studied items. This occurs because interference pushes raw recall and familiarity scores in different directions (increasing interference reduces recall, but asymptotically it boosts familiarity by boosting the model's responding to shared, prototypical item features).
In summary, recall and familiarity can be independent when there is enough interference to counteract the effects of encoding variability.
Partial hippocampal lesions can lead to worse overall recognition performance than complete lesions (see Simulation 8: Lesion Effects in the Combined Model, p. 34).
In the hippocampal model, partial lesions cause pattern separation failure, which sharply reduces the diagnosticity of the recall signal. Recognition performance suffers because the noisy recall signal drowns out useful information that is present in the familiarity signal. Moving from a partial hippocampal lesion to a complete lesion improves performance by removing this source of noise.
In contrast, increasing MTLC lesion size in the model leads to a monotonic decrease in performance. This occurs because MTLC lesions directly impair familiarity-based discrimination, and indirectly impair recall-based discrimination (because MTLC serves as the input to the hippocampus).
These results are consistent with a recent metaanalysis of the lesion data, showing a negative correlation between recognition impairment and hippocampal lesion size, and a positive correlation between recognition impairment and MTLC lesion size (Baxter & Murray, 2001b) .
A Note on Terminology
We use the terms "recall" and "familiarity" to describe the respective contributions of the hippocampus and MTLC to recognition memory because these terms are heuristically useful. The hippocampal contribution to recognition is "recall" insofar as it involves retrieval of specific studied details. We use "familiarity" to describe the MTLC signal because it adheres to the definition of familiarity set forth by Hintzman (1988; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984) and others, i.e., it is a scalar that tracks the global match or similarity of the test probe to studied items.
However, we realize that the terms "recall" and "familiarity" come with a substantial amount of theoretical baggage. Over the years, researchers have made a very large number of claims regarding properties of recall and familiarity; for example, Yonelinas has argued that recall is a high-threshold process (e.g., Yonelinas, 2001a) , and Mandler (1980) and others (e.g., Aggleton & Brown, 1999) have argued that familiarity reflects memory for individual items, apart from their associations with other items and contexts. By linking the hippocampal contribution with recall and the MTLC contribution with familiarity, we do not mean to say that all of the various (and sometimes contradictory) properties that have been ascribed to recall and familiarity over the years apply to the hippocampal and MTLC contributions, respectively. Just the opposite: We hope to "re-define" the properties of recall and familiarity using neurobiological data on the properties of the hippocampus and MTLC. In the paper, we systematically delineate how the CLS model's claims about hippocampal recall and MTLC familiarity deviate from claims made by existing dual-process theories.
Modeling Framework
Both the hippocampal and neocortical networks utilize the Hebbian component of O'Reilly's Leabra algorithm (O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000; O'Reilly, 1998 O'Reilly, , 1996 ; the full version of Leabra also incorporates errordriven learning, but error-driven learning was turned off in the simulations reported here). The algorithm we used incorporates several widely-accepted characteristics of neural computation, including Hebbian LTP/LTD (longterm potentiation/depression) and inhibitory competition between neurons, that were first brought together by Grossberg (1976) (for more information on these mechanisms see also Kohonen, 1977; Oja, 1982; Rumelhart & Zipser, 1986; Kanerva, 1988; Minai & Levy, 1994 ). In our model, LTP is implemented by strengthening the connection (weight) between two units when both the sending and receiving units are active together; LTD is implemented by weakening the connection between two units when the receiving unit is active, but the sending unit is not (heterosynaptic LTD). Inhibitory competition is implemented using a k-winners-take-all (kWTA) algorithm, which sets the amount of inhibition for a given layer such that at most k units are strongly active. Although the kWTA rule sets a firm limit on the number of units that show strong (> .25) activity, there is still considerable flexibility in the overall distribution of activity across units in a layer. This is important for our discussion of "sharpening" in the cortical model, below. Key aspects of the algorithm are summarized in Appendix A.
The Cortical Model
The cortical network is composed of two layers, input (which corresponds to cortical areas that feed into MTLC), and hidden (corresponding to MTLC) (Figure 2) . The basic function of the model is for the hidden layer to encode regularities that are present in the input layer; this is achieved through the Hebbian learning rule. To capture the idea that the input layer represents many different cortical areas, it consists of 24 10-unit slots, with 1 unit out of 10 active in each slot. A useful way to think of slots is that different slots correspond to different feature dimensions (e.g., color or shape), and different units within a slot correspond to different, mutually exclusive features along that dimension (e.g., shapes: circle, square, triangle). The hidden (MTLC) layer consists of 1920 units, with 10% activity (i.e., 192 of these units are active on average for a given input). The input layer is connected to the MTLC layer via a partial feedforward projection where each MTLC unit receives connections from 25% of the input units. When items are presented at study, these connections are modified via Hebbian learning.
Input patterns were constructed from prototypes by
Figure 2: Diagram of the cortical network. The cortical network consists of two layers, an input layer (corresponding to "lower" cortical regions that feed into MTLC) and a hidden layer (corresponding to MTLC). Units in the hidden layer compete to encode (via Hebbian learning) regularities that are present in the input layer.
randomly selecting a feature value (possibly identical to the prototype feature value) for a random subset of slots. The number of slots that were flipped (i.e., given a random value) when generating items from the prototype is a model parameter -increasing the number of slots that are flipped decreases the average overlap between items. When all 24 slots are flipped, the resulting item patterns have 10% overlap with one another on average (i.e., exactly as expected by chance in a layer with a 10% activation level). Thus, with input patterns one can make a distinction between prototypical features of those patterns, which have a relatively high likelihood of being shared across input patterns, and non-prototypical, item-specific features of those patterns (generated by randomly flipping slots) which are relatively less likely to be shared across input patterns. Prototype features can be thought of as representing both high-frequency item features (e.g., if you study pictures of people from Norway, most people have blond hair) as well as contextual features that are shared across multiple items in an experiment (e.g., the fact that all of the pictures were viewed on a particular monitor in a particular room on a particular day). Some simulations involve more complex stimulus construction, as described where applicable.
Familiarity as Sharpening
To apply the cortical model to recognition, we exploit the fact that -as items are presented repeatedly -their representations in the MTLC layer become sharper (Figure 3) . That is, novel stimuli weakly activate a large number of MTLC units, whereas familiar (previously presented) stimuli strongly activate a relatively small num- shows the network after Hebbian learning and inhibitory competition produce sharpening; a subset of the units are strongly active, while the remainder are inhibited. In this example, we would read out familiarity by measuring the average activity of the k = 5 most active units.
ber of units. Sharpening occurs because Hebbian learning specifically tunes some MTLC units to represent the stimulus. When a stimulus is first presented, some MTLC units, by chance, respond more strongly to the stimulus than other units; these units get tuned by Hebbian learning to respond even more strongly to the item the next time it is presented, and these strongly active units start to inhibit units that are less strongly active (for additional discussion of the idea that familiarization causes some units to drop out of the stimulus representation, see Li, Miller, & Desimone, 1993) . We should note that sharpening is not a novel property of our model -rather, it is a general property of competitive learning networks with graded unit activation values in which there is some kind of "contrast enhancement" within a layer (see, e.g., Grossberg, 1986, Section 23, and Stone, 1986, Section 16) . The sharpening dynamic in our model is consistent with neural data on the effects of repeated presentation of stimuli in cortex. Electrophysiological studies show that some neurons that initially respond to a stimulus exhibit a lasting decrease in firing, while other neurons that initially respond to the stimulus do not exhibit decreased firing (e.g., Li et al., 1993; Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1991; Rolls, Baylis, Hasselmo, & Nalwa, 1989; Riches, Wilson, & Brown, 1991) . According to our model, this latter population consists of neurons that were selected (by Hebbian learning) to represent the stimulus, and the former population consists of neurons that are being forced out of the representation via inhibitory competition.
To index representational sharpness in our modeland through this, stimulus familiarity -we measure the average activity of the MTLC units that win the competition to represent the stimulus. That is, we take the average activation of the top (192 or 10% of the MTLC) units computed according to the kWTA inhibitory competition function. This "activation of winners" (act win) measure increases monotonically as a function of how many times a stimulus was presented at study. In contrast, the simpler alternative measure of using the average activity of all units in the layer is not guaranteed to increase as a function of stimulus repetition -as a stimulus becomes more familiar, the winning units become more active, but losing units become less active (due to inhibition from the winning units); the net effect is therefore a function of the exact balance between these increases and decreases (for an example of another model that bases recognition decisions on an activity readout from a neural network doing competitive learning, see Grossberg & Stone, 1986 ).
Although we use
in the simulations reported below, we do not want to make a strong claim that
is the way that familiarity is read out from MTLC. It is the most convenient and analytically tractable way to do this in our model, but it is far from the only way of operationalizing familiarity, and it is unclear how other brain structures might "read out"
We briefly describe another, more neurally plausible familiarity measure (the time it takes for activation to spread through the network) in the General Discussion section. Finally, we should point out that the idea (espoused above) that the same network is involved in feature extraction and familiarity discrimination is controversial; in particular, Malcolm Brown, Rafal Bogacz, and their colleagues (e.g., Bogacz & Brown, in press) have argued that specialized populations of neurons in MTLC are involved in feature extraction versus familiarity discrimination. At this point, it suffices to say that our focus in this paper is on the familiarity discrimination capabilities of the cortical network, rather that its ability to extract features. We address Brown and Bogacz's claims in more detail in the General Discussion.
The Hippocampal Model
We have developed a "standard model" of the hippocampus O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000; ) that implements widely-accepted ideas of hippocampal function (Hebb, 1949; Marr, 1971; McNaughton & Morris, 1987; Rolls, 1989; O'Reilly & McClelland, 1994; McClelland et al., 1995; Hasselmo, 1995 tail to motivate the model's predictions about recognition memory. Additional details regarding the architecture of the hippocampal model (e.g., the percentage activity in each layer of the model) are provided in Appendix B.
In the brain, entorhinal cortex (EC) is the interface between hippocampus and neocortex; superficial layers of entorhinal cortex send input to the hippocampus, and deep layers of entorhinal cortex receive output from the hippocampus (see Figure 1) . Correspondingly, our model subdivides EC into an EC in layer that sends input to the hippocampus and an EC out layer that receives output from the hippocampus. Like the input layer of the cortical model, both EC in and EC out have a slotted structure (24 10-unit slots, with 1 unit per slot active). Figure 4 shows the structure of the model. The job of the hippocampal model, stated succinctly, is to store patterns of EC in activity, in a manner that supports subsequent recall of these patterns on EC out. The hippocampal model achieves this goal in the following stages:
Input patterns are presented to the model by clamping those patterns onto the input layer, which serves to impose the pattern on EC in via fixed, 1-to-1 connections. From EC in, activation spreads both directly and indirectly (via the dentate gyrus, DG) to region CA3. The resulting pattern of activity in CA3 is stored by Hebbian weight changes in the feedforward pathway, and by strengthening recurrent connections in CA3 between active units; these weight changes serve to bind the disparate elements of the input pattern by linking them to a shared episodic representation in CA3.
An important property of DG and CA3 is that representations in these structures are very sparse -relatively few units are active for a given stimulus. The hippocampus' use of sparse representations gives rise to pattern separation. If only a few units are active per input pattern, then overlap between the hippocampal representations of different items tends to be minimal (Marr, 1971; see O'Reilly & McClelland, 1994 for mathematical analysis of how sparseness results in pattern separation, and the role of the DG in facilitating pattern separation).
Next, to complete the loop, the CA3 representation needs to be linked back to the original input pattern. This is accomplished by linking the CA3 representation to active units in region CA1. Like CA3, region CA1 contains a re-representation of the input pattern. However, unlike the CA3 representation, the CA1 representation is invertible -if an item's representation is activated in CA1, well-established connections between CA1 and EC out allow activity to spread back to the item's representation in EC out. Thus, CA1 serves to "translate" between sparse representations in CA3 and more overlapping representations in EC (for more discussion of this issue, see McClelland & Goddard, 1996; O'Reilly et al., 1998) .
At test, when a previously studied EC in pattern (or a subset thereof) is presented to the hippocampal model, the model is capable of reactivating the entire CA3 pattern corresponding to that item via strengthened weights in the EC-to-CA3 pathway, and strengthened CA3 recurrents. Activation then spreads from the item's CA3 representation to the item's CA1 representation via strengthened weights, and (from there) to the item's EC out representation. In this manner, the hippocampus manages to retrieve a complete version of the studied EC pattern in response to a partial cue.
The Hippocampal Recall Measure
To apply the hippocampal model to recognition, we exploit the fact that studied items tend to trigger recall (of the item itself), more so than lure items. Thus, a high level of match between the test probe (presented on the EC input layer) and recalled information (activated over the EC output layer) constitutes evidence that an item was studied. Also, we exploit the fact that lures sometimes trigger recall of information that mismatches the recall cue. Thus, mismatch between recalled information and the test probe tends to indicate that an item was not studied.
For each test item, we generate a recall score using the formula:
where match is the number of recalled features (on EC out) that match the cue (on EC in), and mismatch is likewise the number that mismatch (a feature is counted as "recalled" if the unit corresponding to that feature in EC out shows activity > .9); numslots is a constant that reflects the total number of feature slots in EC (24, in these simulations).
One should appreciate that equation 1 is not the only way to apply the hippocampal model to recognition. For example, instead of looking at recall of the test cue itself, we could attach contextual tags to items at study, leave these tags out at test, and measure the extent to which items elicit recall of contextual tags. Also this equation does not incorporate the fact that recall of itemspecific features (i.e., features unique to particular items in the item set) is more diagnostic of study status than recall of prototypical features -if all items in the experiment are fish, recall of prototypical fish features (e.g., "I studied fish") in conjunction with a test item does not mean that you studied this particular item. We selected the
rule because it is a simple way to reduce the vector output of the hippocampal model to a scalar that correlates with the study status of test items. Assessing the optimality of this rule, relative to other rules, and exploring ways in which different rules might be implemented neurally, are topics for future research.
The only place where we deviate from using
in this paper is in our related lure simulations, where distractors are related to particular studied items, but studied items are reasonably distinct from one another. In this situation, we use a recall-toreject rule that places a stronger weight on mismatching recall. The YN Related Lure Simulations section of the paper contains a detailed account of our reasons for using recall-to-reject, and the implications of using this rule in place of
Simulation Methodology
Our initial simulations involve a side-by-side comparison of the cortical and hippocampal networks receiving the exact same input patterns. This method allows us to analytically characterize differences in how these networks respond to stimuli. A shortcoming of this "side-by-side" approach is that we can not explore direct interactions between the two systems. To remedy this shortcoming, we also present simulations using a combined model where the cortical and hippocampal networks are connected in serial (such that the cortical regions involved in computing stimulus familiarity serve as the input to the hippocampal network) -this arrangement more accurately reflects how cortex and hippocampus are arranged in the brain (see Figure 1 ).
Basic Methods
In our recognition simulations, for each simulated "participant" we re-randomized the connectivity patterns for partial projections (e.g., if the specified amount of connectivity between layer X and layer Y was 25%, then each unit in layer Y was linked at random to 25% of the units in layer X) and we initialized the network weights to random values (weight values in the cortical model were sampled from a uniform distribution with mean = .5 and range = .25; see Appendix B for weight initialization parameters for different parts of the hippocampal model). The purpose of this randomization was to ensure that units in MTLC and the hippocampus would develop specialized receptive fields (i.e., they would be more strongly activated by some input features than others) -this kind of specialization is necessary for competitive learning.
After randomization was complete, the cortical and hippocampal models were (separately) given a list of items to learn, followed by a recognition test in which the models had to discriminate between 10 studied target items and 10 nonstudied lure items. No learning occurred at test. Unless otherwise specified, all of our recognition simulations used the same set of parameters (hereafter referred to as the basic parameters; these parameters are described in detail in Appendix C). In our basic-parameter simulations, we used a 20-item study list (10 target items, plus 10 interference items that were not tested), and the average amount of overlap between items was 20% -20% overlap between items was achieved by starting with a 24-slot prototype pattern, and then generating items by randomly selecting a feature value for 16 randomly selected slots (note that each item overlaps at least 33% with the prototype, but on average items overlap 20% with each other).
To facilitate comparison between the models, we used hippocampal and cortical parameters that yielded roughly matched performance across the two models for both single-probe (yes-no, or YN) and forced-choice (FC) recognition tests. We matched performance in this way to alleviate concerns that differential effects of manipulations on hippocampal recall and MTLC familiarity are attributable simply to different overall levels of performance in the two networks. However, this matching does not constitute a strong claim that hippocampal and cortical performance are -in reality -matched when overlap equals 20% and study list length equals 20.
Simulating YN and FC Testing
To simulate YN recognition performance, items were presented one at a time at test, and we recorded the familiarity score (in the cortical model) and recall score (in the hippocampal model) triggered by each item. For the cortical model, we set an unbiased criterion for each simulated participant by computing the average familiarity scores associated with studied and lure items (respectively) and then placing the familiarity criterion exactly between the studied and lure means. All items triggering familiarity scores above this criterion were called "old".
For the hippocampal model, we took a different approach to criterion setting; as discussed in Simulation 2 below, it is possible to set a high recall criterion that is sometimes crossed by studied items, but never crossed by lures. We assume that participants are aware of this fact (i.e., that high amounts of recall are especially diagnostic of having studied an item) and set a recall criterion that is high enough to avoid false recognition. Accordingly, in our basic-parameter simulations, we used a fixed, relatively high criterion for calling items "old" (recall >= .40). This value was chosen because -assuming other parameters are set to their "basic" values -it is sometimes exceeded by studied items, but never by lures (unless lures are constructed to be similar to specific studied items; see Simulation 3 for more details).
For both models, we used ¢ ¡
(computed on individual participants' hit and false alarm rates) to index YN recognition sensitivity.
1
Our method for simulating FC testing was straightforward: We presented the two test alternatives, one at a time. For the cortical model, we recorded the
score associated with each test alternative, and selected the item with the higher score. For the hippocampal model, we recorded the
score associated with each test alternative, and selected the item with the higher score. For both models, if there was a tie, one of the two test alternatives was selected at random.
All of the simulation results reported in the text of the paper are significant at £ ¥ ¤ .001. In graphs of simulation results (starting with Figure 9 ), error bars indicate the standard error of the mean, computed across simulated participants. When error bars are not visible, this is because they are too small relative to the size of the symbols on the graph (and thus are covered by the symbols).
is the inverse of the normal distribution function, is the hit rate, and " is the false alarm rate. To avoid problems with ¦ § being undefined when hit or false alarm rates equal 0 or 1, we adjusted hit and false alarm rates using the correction suggested by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) 
Part I: Basic Network Properties
Simulations in this section address basic properties of the cortical and hippocampal networks, including differences in their ability to assign distinct ("patternseparated") representations to input patterns, and differences in their operating characteristics. We also discuss sources of variability in the two networks.
Simulation 1: Pattern Separation
Many of the differences between hippocampally-and cortically-driven recognition in our model arise from the fact that the hippocampal network exhibits more pattern separation than the cortical network. To document the two networks' pattern separation abilities, we ran simulations where we manipulated the amount of overlap between paired input patterns. The first item in each pair was presented at study and the second item was presented at test. For each pair, we measured the resulting amount of overlap in region CA3 of the hippocampal model, and in the hidden (MTLC) layer of the cortical model. Pattern separation is evident when overlap between the internal representations of paired items (in CA3 or MTLC) is less than the amount of input overlap.
The results of these simulations ( Figure 5 ) confirm that, while both networks show some pattern separation, the amount of pattern separation is larger in the hippocampal model. They also show that the hippocampus' ability to assign distinct representations to stimuli is limited -as overlap between input patterns increases, hippocampal overlap eventually increases above floor levels (although it always lags behind input pattern overlap).
Simulation 2: Nature of the Underlying Distributions
One way to characterize how cortical and hippocampal contributions to recognition differ is to plot the distributions of these signals for studied items and lures. Given 20% average overlap between input patterns, the MTLC familiarity distributions for studied items and lures are Gaussian and overlap strongly ( Figure 6a ) -this is consistent with the idea, expressed by Yonelinas, Dobbins, Szymanski, and Dhaliwal (1996) and many others (e.g., Hintzman, 1988) , that familiarity is welldescribed by standard (Gaussian) signal-detection theory. In contrast, the hippocampal recall distributions ( Figure 6b ) do not adhere to a simple Gaussian model. The bulk of the lure recall distribution is located at the zero recall point, although some lures trigger above-zero recall. The studied recall distribution is bimodal and, crucially, it extends further to the right than the lure recall distribution, so there are some (high) recall scores that are sometimes triggered by studied items, but never by lures. Thus, high levels of recall are highly diagnostic -for these parameters, if an item triggers a recall score of .2 or greater, you can be completely sure that it was studied.
The low overall level of lure recall in this simulation can be attributed to hippocampal pattern separation. Because of pattern separation, the CA3 representations of lures do not overlap strongly with the CA3 representations of studied items. Because the CA3 units activated by lures (for the most part) were not activated at study, these units do not possess strong links to CA1; as such, activity does not spread from CA3 to CA1, and recall does not occur.
The studied recall distribution is bimodal because of nonlinear attractor dynamics in the hippocampus. If a studied test cue accesses a sufficiently large number of strengthened weights, it triggers pattern completion: Positive feedback effects (e.g., in the CA3 recurrents) re- sult in strong re-activation of the CA3 and CA1 units that were activated at study, thereby boosting recall. Most studied items benefit from these positive feedback effects but, because of variability in initial weight values, some studied items do not have weights strong enough to yield positive feedback. These items only weakly activate CA3 and are poorly recalled, thereby accounting for the extra "peak" at recall = 0.
Limits on Diagnosticity: High Average Overlap
Increasing the average amount of overlap between items reduces the diagnosticity of the hippocampal recall signal. When the amount of overlap between input patterns is high (e.g., 40.5%, instead of 20%), both studied items and lures trigger large amounts of recall, such that the studied and lure recall distributions are roughly Gaussian and overlap extensively (Figure 7 ).
High levels of lure recall occur in the high-overlap condition because of pattern separation failure in the hippocampus. As documented in Simulation 1 (Figure 5) , the hippocampus loses its ability to assign distinct representations to input patterns when overlap between inputs is very high. In this situation, the same CA3 units -the units that are most sensitive to frequentlyoccurring prototype features -are activated again and again by studied patterns, and these units acquire very strong weights to the representations of prototype features in CA1. When items are presented at test, they activate these "core" CA3 units to some extent (regardless of whether or not the test item was studied), and activation spreads very quickly to CA1, leading to possibly erroneous recall of prototype features in response to Figure 8 shows that increasing overlap increases the probability that prototypical features of studied items and lures will be recalled, and reduces the probability that item-specific features of studied items will be recalled (in part, because the hippocampus intrudes prototypical features in place of these item-specific features). In summary, The results presented here show that hippocampal recall has two modes of operation: When input patterns have low-to-moderate average overlap, high levels of matching recall are highly diagnosticstudied items sometimes trigger strong recall (of itemspecific and prototype features) but lures trigger virtu- : Plot of the probability that item-specific and prototypical features of studied items and lures will be recalled, as a function of overlap. As overlap increases, the amount of prototype recall triggered by studied items and lures increases, the amount of item-specific recall triggered by studied items decreases.
ally no recall. In contrast, when input patterns have high average overlap, recall functions as a standard signaldetection process -both studied items and lures trigger varying degrees of prototype recall.
Simulation 3: YN Related Lure Simulations
The strengths of the hippocampal model are most evident on yes-no related lure recognition tests, where lures are similar to studied items, but studied items are dissimilar to one another. In this section, we show how the hippocampal model outperforms the cortical model on these tests, because of its superior pattern separation and pattern completion abilities.
Methods
To simulate the related lure paradigm, we first created studied item patterns with 20% average overlap between items. Then, for each studied (target) item, we created a related lure item by taking the studied item and flipping a pre-specified number of slots; to vary targetlure similarity, we varied the number of slots that we flipped to generate lures (less flipping results in more overlap). For comparison, we also ran simulations with "unrelated" lures that were sampled from the same item pool as studied items.
In the related lure simulations presented here (and later in the paper), we used a recall-to-reject hippocampal decision rule instead of our standard
rule. According to this rule, items that trigger any mismatch are given a "new" response, otherwise the decision is based on match. We used this rule for two reasons: First, there is extensive empirical evidence that, when lures are similar to studied items, but studied items are unrelated to one another, participants use recall-toreject (see, e.g., Rotello, Macmillan, & Van Tassel, 2000; Rotello & Heit, 2000; Yonelinas, 1997 ; but see Rotello & Heit, 1999 for a contrasting view). Second, it is computationally sensible to use recall-to-rejectwe show that the presence of mismatching recall in this paradigm is highly diagnostic of an item being nonstudied. Figure 9 shows the results of our related lure simulations: Recognition performance based on MTLC familiarity gets steadily worse as lures become increasingly similar to studied items; in contrast, recognition based on hippocampal recall is relatively robust to the lure similarity manipulation. Figure 9 also shows that hippocampal performance is somewhat better for related lures when the recall-to-reject rule is used (as opposed to
Results
). The cortical model results can be explained in terms of the fact that the cortical model assigns similar representations to similar stimuli -because the representations of similar lures (vs. dissimilar lures) overlap more with the representations of studied items, similar lures benefit more from learning that occurs at study. Thus, lure familiarity smoothly tracks target-lure similarity; increasing similarity monotonically lowers the targetlure familiarity difference, leading to decreased discriminability.
In contrast, the hippocampal recall signal triggered by lures is stuck at floor until target-lure similarity > Effect of Target Hippo with recall-to-reject Hippo (match -mismatch) MTLC Figure 9 : YN recognition sensitivity ( § ) in the two models, as a function of target-lure similarity. Target-lure similarity was operationalized as the proportion of input features shared by targets and corresponding lures; note that the average level of overlap between studied (target) items was held constant at 20%. These simulations show that the hippocampal model is more robust to increasing target-lure similarity than the cortical model. The figure also shows that hippocampal performance for related lures is better when a recall-to-reject rule is used instead of match -mismatch . 60%, and lures do not start to trigger above-criterion (i.e., > .40) recall until target-lure similarity > 80%. This occurs because of hippocampal pattern separation -lures have to be very similar to studied items before they access enough strengthened weights to trigger recall.
The hippocampus also benefits from the fact that lures sometimes trigger pattern completion of the corresponding studied item, and can subsequently be rejected based on mismatch between recalled information and the test cue. Figure 10 illustrates the point (mentioned earlier) that when lures resemble studied items, but studied items are not related to one another, mismatching recall is highly diagnostic -studied items virtually never trigger mismatching recall, but lures sometimes do. As such, it makes sense to use a rule (like recall-to-reject) that assigns a very high weight to mismatching recall.
Figure 10 also shows that mismatching recall triggered by lures increases substantially with increasing target-lure similarity. This increase in mismatching recall helps offset, to some degree, increased matching recall triggered by related lures. With recall-to-reject, the only way that lures can trigger an old response is if they trigger a large amount of matching recall but no mismatching recall. The odds of this happening are very low.
In summary: These simulations demonstrate that 
Studied items Lures
Figure 10: Plot of the probability that lures and studied items will trigger mismatching recall, as a function of target-lure similarity. This probability is close to floor for studied items; the probability that lures will trigger mismatching recall increases with increasing target-lure similarity.
both networks can support good performance on YN recognition tests with lures that are unrelated to studied items. When the networks are challenged by boosting target-lure similarity, performance in both networks suffers; however, the hippocampus is more robust to this manipulation than cortex. As such, the model predicts that recognition discrimination based on hippocampal recall should be better than discrimination based on MTLC familiarity on YN tests with related lures. This prediction is consistent with the view, expressed in several empirical papers, that recall is especially important for discriminating between studied items and very similar distractors (e.g., Hintzman, Curran, & Oppy, 1992; .
Sources of Variability
The final issue that we need to address in the Basic Network Properties section is variability. Recognition performance involves detecting the presence of a variable memory signal against a background of noise. Many distinct forms of variability can affect recognition performance; we need to carefully delineate which of these sources of variability are present in our models, because -as we show later -different forms of variability have different implications for recognition performance.
The primary source of variability in our models is sampling variability: variation in how well, on average, neural units are connected to (sampled by) other neural units in the network. Note that our use of the term "sampling variability" differs from how other modelers have used this term. In our model, sampling variability is a function of variability in the initial values assigned to weights in the network. Other models use sampling variability to refer to variability in which item features are presented to the model at study and test (Atkinson & Estes, 1963) , or variability in which memory trace is retrieved at test (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984) .
Sampling variability arises because, at the beginning of each simulation, weight strengths and connectivity patterns are set randomly. As discussed earlier, this randomness helps units in MTLC and the hippocampus form specialized representations of the input space. It also has the consequence that, by chance, some input features are sampled better (by units further "downstream") than other input features.
An important property of sampling variability is that it decreases as network size increases. Intuitively, as the number of units and connections increases, the odds that any one input pattern will be "undersampled" relative to another decreases. We conducted simulations to explore this issue, and the results were very clear: As we increased network size, variability in MTLC familiarity and hippocampal recall scores steadily decreased, and ¡ scores steadily increased.
In a network scaled to the approximate size of the human brain, sampling variability would likely be negligible. Therefore, we conclude that other forms of variability must be at play in the human brain; we briefly describe some other sources of variability below.
Other Sources of Variability
A potentially important source of variability in recall and familiarity scores is variability in how well stimuli are encoded at study. This kind of encoding variability can arise, for example, if participants' attention fluctuates over the course of an experiment -some items will be encoded more strongly than others, leading to higher recall and familiarity scores at test.
An important property of encoding variability, which is not true of sampling variability, is that it affects studied items and related lures in tandem. That is, encoding fluctuations that boost the memory signal triggered by a studied item also boost the memory signal triggered by lures that are similar to that studied item (e.g., if "cat" is encoded so as to be especially familiar, the related lure "cats" will also be highly familiar). In contrast, sampling variability operates independently on each input feature; in small networks where sampling variability is the dominant source of variance, noise associated with sampling of non-shared (discriminative) features of overlapping stimuli counteracts much of the shared variability in memory scores triggered by these items. We revisit this issue later, when we explore how lure relatedness interacts with test format (Simulation 4).
Another source of variability in recall and familiarity scores is variability in pre-experimental exposure to stimuli: Some stimuli have been encountered extensively prior to the experiment, in many different contexts; other stimuli are relatively novel; for evidence that preexperimental presentation frequency affects recognition memory, see Dennis and Humphreys (2001) . Variability in pre-experimental exposure (like encoding variability, but unlike sampling variability) affects studied items and related lures in tandem.
Finally, in addition to variability in how much test items overlap with pre-experimental memory traces, there is also variability in how much items overlap with other items presented in the experiment; this kind of variability also affects studied items and related lures in tandem. Overlap-related variability is already present in the model, but its effect on performance is typically dwarfed by sampling variability. Consequently, variability in overlap should play a much larger role, proportionally, in larger networks with minimal sampling variability.
Sources of Variability: Summary
In summary, the basic model (as described above) is strongly influenced by sampling variability, and lacks other, plausible sources of variability such as encoding variability. Given that sampling variability is not likely to be a factor in human recognition memory performance, one might conclude that we should eliminate this source of variability and incorporate other sources. Unfortunately, this is not practical at present -models that are large enough to eliminate sampling variability cannot be feasibly run on available computational hardware. Furthermore, adding more variability on top of sampling variability in our small networks leads to poor performance, unless other steps are taken to compensate for increased variability (e.g., increasing the learning rate).
Because of these limitations, we refrain from making strong predictions about how manipulations affect variance in this paper. Nevertheless, we can still use the basic model to explain many phenomena that do not depend on the exact source of variability. Also, it is relatively straightforward to supplement the basic model with other forms of variability on an "as needed" basis, and we do this to make some important points in Simulation 4.
Part II: Applications To Behavioral Phenomena
The simulations in this part of the paper build on the basic results described earlier, by applying the models to a wide range of empirical recognition memory phe-nomena (e.g., how does interference affect recognition performance in the two models). Whenever possible, we present data that speak to the model's predictions.
Simulation 4: Lure Relatedness and Test
Format Interactions
As we saw in Figure 9 , the model predicts that the hippocampus should outperform cortex on standard YN tests where participants have to discriminate between studied items and related lures. In this section, we show how giving participants a forced choice between studied items and corresponding related lures benefits performance in the cortical model but not the hippocampal model, thereby mitigating the hippocampal advantage.
Forced-Choice Testing and Covariance
In an forced-choice (FC) test, participants are simultaneously presented with a studied item and a lure, and are asked to select the studied item. The specific version of this test that boosts cortical performance involves pairing studied items with corresponding related lures (i.e., lures related to the paired studied item; for example, study "RAT", test "RAT" vs. "RATS").
The central insight as to why this format improves cortical performance with related lures is that, even though related lures trigger strong feelings of familiarity (because they overlap with the studied items), corresponding studied items are reliably more familiar. Because performance in an FC test is based on the difference in familiarity between paired items, even small differences can drive good performance, as long as they are reliable.
The reliability of the familiarity difference depends on where variability comes from in the model. As discussed in the previous section, some kinds of variability (e.g., differences in encoding strength and preexperimental exposure) necessarily affect studied and related lure familiarity in tandem, whereas other kinds of variability (e.g., sampling variability) do not. When the former kind of variability predominates, the familiarity values of studied items and corresponding lures will be highly correlated, and therefore their difference will be reliable. When sampling variability predominates, the studied-lure familiarity difference will be somewhat less reliable.
More formally, the beneficial effect of using an FC test depends on covariance in the familiarity scores triggered by studied items and corresponding related lures (Hintzman, 1988 (Hintzman, , 2001 . The variance of the studied-lure familiarity difference is given by the following equation: 
FC Simulations Using the Basic Cortical Model
Our first concern was to assess how much FC testing with corresponding related lures benefits performance in our basic cortical model. Towards this end, we ran simulations using a paradigm introduced by Hintzman (1988) ; in these simulations, we compared FC performance with corresponding related lures (i.e., study A, B; test A vs. A', B vs. B', where A' and B' are lures related to A and B, respectively) to FC performance with non-corresponding lures (e.g., study A, B; test A vs. B'; B vs. A'). To the extent that there is covariance between studied items and corresponding lures, this will benefit performance in the corresponding lure condition relative to the non-corresponding lures.
As shown in Figure 11 , FC performance is higher with corresponding related lures than with noncorresponding lures -this replicates the empirical results obtained by Hintzman (1988) and shows that there is some covariance present in the basic cortical model. To quantify the level of covariance underlying these results, we can compute the following ratio:
When ! = 1, covariance will completely offset studied and lure variance, and the studied-lure familiarity differ-ence will be completely reliable (i.e., variance = 0); ! = 0 means that there is no covariance. For target-lure similarity = .92, the covariance ratio ! = .27 in the corresponding condition and ! = -.01 in the non-corresponding condition. Thus, the model exhibits roughly one third the maximal level of covariance possible.
In summary: Although the basic model qualitatively exhibits an FC advantage with corresponding related lures, this advantage is not quantitatively very large. This is because the dominant source of variability in the basic cortical model is sampling variability, which -as discussed above -does not reliably affect studied items and corresponding lures in tandem.
Cortical and Hippocampal Simulations With Encoding Variability
Next, we wanted to explore a more realistic scenario in which the contribution of sampling variability to overall variability is small, relative to other forms of variability (like encoding variability) that affect studied items and corresponding lures in tandem. Increasing the relative contribution of encoding variability should increase covariance, and thereby increase the extent to which the cortical model benefits from use of an FC-corresponding test. We were also interested in how test format affects the hippocampal model's ability to discriminate between studied items and related lures (when encoding variability is high). To address these issues, we ran simulations with added encoding variability in both the cortical and hippocampal models, where we manipulated test format (FC-corresponding vs. FC-non-corresponding vs. YN) and lure relatedness.
Methods
We added encoding variability using the following simple manipulation: For each item at study, the learning rate was scaled by a random number from the 0-to-1 uniform distribution. However, this manipulation by itself does not achieve the desired result; the influence of encoding variability is still too small relative to sampling variability, and overall performance levels with added encoding variability are unacceptably low. To boost the relative impact of encoding variability (and overall performance), we also increased the learning rate in both models to three times its usual value. Under this regime, random scaling of the learning rate at study has a much larger effect on studied-item (and related-lure) familiarity than random differences in how well features are sampled. We should note that using a large learning rate has some undesirable side-effects (e.g., increased interference), but these side-effects are orthogonal to the questions we are asking here. As with the hippocampal related lure simulations presented earlier, the hippocampal simulations presented here used a recall-to-reject decision rule. We applied this rule to FC testing in the following manner: If one item triggered mismatching recall, but the other item did not, the second item was selected; otherwise, the item triggering a higher
recall score was selected.
Cortical FC Results
As expected, the corresponding vs. noncorresponding difference for the cortical model was much larger in our simulations with encoding variability (Figure 12a ) than in our simulations without encoding variability (Figure 11 ). Computing the average covariance/variance ratio for the .92 target-lure overlap condition shows that ! = .62 for corresponding lures vs. ! = -.05 for non-corresponding lures. This is more than double the covariance in the basic model (.62 vs. .27), and confirms our intuition that decreasing the contribution of sampling variability relative to encoding variability should increase covariance and boost performance in the FC-corresponding condition.
Hippocampal FC Results
In contrast to the cortical model results, FCcorresponding and FC-non-corresponding performance were almost identical in the hippocampal model (Figure 12a) . It seems clear that the same arguments about covariance benefiting FC-corresponding performance should hold for hippocampus as well as for cortex. Why then does the hippocampus behave differently than the cortex in this situation? This can be explained by looking at what happens on trials where the studied item is not recalled -on these trials, participants can still respond correctly if the lure triggers mismatching recall (and is rejected on this basis). The key insight is that studied recall and lure misrecall are independent when non-corresponding lures are used (in effect, participants get two independent chances to make a correct response), but they are highly correlated when corresponding lures are used -if the studied item does not trigger any recall, the corresponding lure probably will not trigger any recall either. Thus, using corresponding lures can actually hurt performance in the hippocampal model by depriving participants of an extra, independent chance to respond correctly (via recall-to-reject) on trials where studied recall fails. This harmful effect of covariance cancels out the beneficial effects of covariance described earlier.
Because the cortical model benefits from FCcorresponding (vs. non-corresponding) testing but the hippocampal model does not, the performance of the cortical model relative to the hippocampal model is better in this condition.
YN Results
The results of our YN simulations with encoding variability (Figure 12b ) were identical to the results of non-corresponding lures (more so than in our simulations without encoding variability). In contrast, the hippocampal model (using recall-to-reject) performs equally well with corresponding vs. non-corresponding lures. (b) Results of YN simulations using the same parameters. As in our previous related-lure simulations (Figure 9 ), the cortical model is severely impaired relative to the hippocampal model on these tests.
our earlier YN-related-lure simulations. As before, we found that the hippocampal model was much better than the cortical model at discriminating between studied items and related lures on YN tests.
Tests of the Model's Predictions
One way to test the model's predictions is to look at recognition in patients with focal, relatively complete hippocampal damage. Presumably, these patients are (2002) related lure experiment. Participants studied pictures of objects (e.g., the horse shown in the upper left). At test, participants had to discriminate studied pictures from three highly related lures (e.g., the horses shown in the upper right, lower left, and lower right).
relying exclusively on MTLC familiarity when making recognition judgments (in contrast to controls, who have access to both hippocampal recall and MTLC familiarity). As such, patients should perform poorly relative to controls on tests where hippocampus outperforms cortex, and they should perform relatively well on tests where hippocampus and cortex are evenly matched. Applying this logic to the results shown in Figure 12 , patients should be impaired on YN recognition tests with related lures, but they should perform relatively well on FCcorresponding tests with related lures, and on tests with unrelated lures (regardless of test format).
To test this prediction, we collaborated with Andrew Mayes and Juliet Holdstock to test patient YR, who suffered focal hippocampal damage, sparing surrounding MTLC regions (for details of the etiology and extent of YR's lesion, see Holdstock et al., 2002) . YR is severely impaired at recalling specific details -thus, YR has to rely almost exclusively on MTLC familiarity when making recognition judgments. Holdstock et al. (2002) developed YN and FC tests with highly related lures that were closely matched for difficulty, and administered these tests to patient YR and her controls. Figure 13 shows sample stimuli from this experiment. Results from this experiment can be compared to results from 15 other YN item recognition tests and 25 other FC item recognition tests that used lures that were less strongly related to studied items ; we refer to these tests as the YN-low-relatedness and FC-low-relatedness tests, respectively. Figure 14 shows that, exactly as we predicted, YR was significantly impaired on a YN recognition test that used highly related lures, but showed relatively spared performance on an FC version of the same test (YR actually performed slightly better than the control mean on this test). This pattern can not be explained in terms of difficulty confounds (i.e., YR performing worse, relative to controls, on the more difficult test) -controls found the YN test with highly related lures to be slightly easier than the FC test. Figure 14 also shows that YR was, on average, unimpaired on YN-low-relatedness and FClow-relatedness tests. YR performed worse on the YN test with highly related lures than on any of the 15 YNlow-relatedness tests; this difference can not be attributed to the YN-low-relatedness tests being easier than the YN test with highly related lures: YR showed unimpaired performance on the 8 YN low-relatedness tests that controls found to be more difficult than the YN test with highly related lures; for these eight tests her mean z-score was 0.04 ( £ § = 0.49; minimum = -0.54; maximum = 0.65; J. Holdstock, personal communication). We have yet to test the model's prediction regarding use of FCcorresponding vs. FC-non-corresponding tests with related lures; based on the results shown in Figure 12 , the model predicts that YR will be more strongly impaired on FC tests with non-corresponding (vs. corresponding) related lures.
Simulation 5: Associative Recognition and Sensitivity to Conjunctions
In this section, we explore the two networks' performance on associative recognition tests. On these tests, participants have to discriminate between studied pairs of stimuli (A-B, C-D) and associative lures generated by recombining studied pairs (A-D, B-C). To show abovechance associative recognition performance, a network must be sensitive to whether features occurred together at study; sensitivity to individual features does not help discriminate between studied pairs and recombined lures. The hippocampus' ability to rapidly encode and store feature conjunctions is not in dispute -this is a central feature of practically all theories of hippocampal functioning, including ours (e.g., Rudy & Sutherland, 1995; Squire, 1992b; Rolls, 1989; Teyler & Discenna, 1986) . In contrast, many theorists have argued that neocortex is not capable of rapidly forming new conjunctive representations (i.e., representations that support differential responding to conjunctions vs. their constituent elements) on its own; see O'Reilly and Rudy (2001) for a review.
Associative recognition can be viewed as a special case of the related lure paradigm described earlier. As such, we would expect the hippocampus to outperform cortex on YN associative recognition tests, because of its superior pattern separation abilities, and its ability to reject similar lures based on mismatching recall.
Methods
In our associative recognition simulations, 20 item pairs were presented at study -each "pair" consisted of a 12-slot pattern concatenated with another 12-slot pattern; at test, studied pairs were presented, along with three types of lures: associative (re-paired) lures, feature lures (generated by pairing a studied item with a nonstudied item), and novel lures (generated by pairing two nonstudied items). Our initial simulations used a YN test format.
YN Results
As expected, the hippocampal model outperformed the cortical model in our YN associative recognition simulations (Figure 15 ). The other important result from the YN associative recognition simulations was that cortical performance was well above chance. This indicates that cortex is sensitive (to some degree) to feature cooccurrence in addition to individual feature occurrence. in the cortical and hippocampal models. Using parameters that yield matched performance for unrelated (novel) lures, cortex is impaired relative to the hippocampus at associative recognition; nonetheless, cortex performs well above chance on the associative recognition tests.
The ability of the cortical model to encode stimulus conjunctions can be explained in terms of the fact that cortex, like the hippocampus, uses sparse representations (as enforced by the k-winners-take-all algorithm). The kWTA algorithm forces units to compete to represent input patterns, and units that are sensitive to multiple features of a given input pattern (i.e., feature conjunctions) are more likely to win the competition than units that are only sensitive to single input features. Representations are more conjunctive in the hippocampus than in cortex because representations are more sparse (i.e., there is stronger inhibitory competition) in the hippocampus than in the cortex. For additional computational support for the notion that cortex should encode low-order conjunctive representations, see O'Reilly and Busby (2002) .
Effects of Test Format
In Simulation 4 we showed how giving participants a forced choice between studied items and corresponding related lures mitigates the hippocampal advantage for related lures. Analogously, giving participants a forced choice between overlapping studied pairs and lures (FC-OLAP testing: study A-B, C-D test A-B vs. A-D) mitigates the hippocampal advantage for associative recognition. In both cases, performance suffers because participants do not get an "extra chance" to respond correctly (via recall-to-reject) when studied recall fails.
Typically, FC-OLAP tests are structured in a way that emphasizes the shared item: Participants are asked, "which of these items was paired with A: B or D?". This encourages participants use a strategy where they cue with the shared item (A), and select the choice (B or D) that best matches retrieved information. The problem with this algorithm is that success or failure depends entirely on whether the shared cue (A) triggers recall; if A fails to trigger recall of B, participants are forced to guess. In contrast, on FC associative recognition tests with non-overlapping choices (FC-NOLAP tests: study A-B, C-D, E-F; test A-B vs. C-F), participants have multiple, independent chances to respond correctly; even if A does not trigger recall of B, participant can still respond correctly if they recall that C was paired with D (not F).
To demonstrate how recall-to-reject differentially benefits FC-NOLAP performance (relative to FC-OLAP performance), we ran FC-NOLAP and FC-OLAP simulations in the hippocampal model using a recall-to-reject rule. For comparison purposes, we ran another set of simulations where decisions were based purely on the amount of matching recall.
Methods
These simulations used a cued recall algorithm where, for each test pair (e.g., A-B), we cued with the first pair item and measured how well recalled information matched the second pair item. On FC-OLAP tests, we cued with the shared pair item (A) for both test alternatives (A-B vs. A-D). On FC-NOLAP tests we cued with the first item of each test alternative (A from A-B, and C from C-D). We had to adjust some model parameters to get the model to work well using partial cues; specifically, we used a higher-than usual learning rate (.03 vs. .01) to help foster pattern completion of information not in the cue, and we increased the activation criterion for counting a feature as recalled (from .90 to .95) to compensate for the fact that the output of the model is less clean with partial cues.
Results
As expected, FC-NOLAP performance was higher in the recall-to-reject condition (vs. the "match-only" condition) but FC-OLAP performance did not benefit at all (Figure 16 ). Because of this differential benefit, FC-NOLAP performance was better overall than FC-OLAP performance in the recall-to-reject condition. Consistent with this prediction, Clark, Hori, and Callan (1993) found better performance on an FC-NOLAP associative recognition test than on an FC-OLAP associative recognition test. They explained this finding in a manner that is consistent with our account -they argued that participants were using recall of studied pairs to reject lures, and that participants have more unique (independent) chances to recall useful information in the FC-NOLAP condition.
Tests of the Model's Predictions
The implications of the above simulation results for patient performance are clear: Patients with focal hippocampal lesions should be impaired, relative to controls, on YN associative recognition tests, but they should be relatively less impaired on FC-OLAP associative recognition tests.
No one has yet conducted a direct comparison of how well patients with hippocampal damage perform relative to controls, as a function of test format. However, there are several relevant data points in the literature. Kroll et al. (1996) studied associative recognition performance in a patient with bilateral hippocampal damage (caused by anoxia), as well as other patients with less focal lesions. In Experiment 1 of the Kroll et al. (1996) paper, participants studied 2-syllable words (e.g., "barter", "valley") and had to discriminate between studied words and words created by re-combining studied words (e.g., "barley"). Results from the patient with bilateral hippocampal damage, as well as control data, are plotted in Figure 17 . In keeping with the model's predictions, the patient showed impaired YN associative recognition performance, but YN discrimination with novel lures (where neither part of the stimulus was studied) was intact. Furthermore, even though the patient was impaired at as- hippocampal damage (taken from Kroll et al. (1996) , Experiment 1); § scores for the patient and controls were computed based on average hit and false alarm rates published in Table 3 of that paper. The patient performed better than adult controls at discriminating studied items from novel lures but was worse than controls at discriminating studied items from feature lures (where one part of the stimulus was old and one part was new) and was much worse that controls when lures were generated by re-combining studied stimuli. The pattern reported here is qualitatively consistent with the model's predictions as shown in Figure 15. sociative recognition, the patient's performance in this experiment was above chance. This is consistent with the idea that cortex is sensitive (to some degree) to feature conjunctions. However, this study does not speak to whether cortex can form novel associations between previously unrelated stimuli -because stimuli (including lures) were familiar words, participants do not necessarily have to form a new conjunctive representation to solve this task.
Two studies (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; Mayes et al., 2001) have examined how well patients with focal hippocampal damage perform on FC-OLAP tests where participants are cued with one pair item and have to say which of two items was paired with that item at study. The Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997) study used unrelated word pairs, nonword pairs, familiar face pairs, and unfamiliar face pairs as stimuli, and the Mayes et al. (2001) study used unrelated word pairs as stimuli. In all of these studies, the hippocampally-lesioned patients were unimpaired. This is consistent with the model's prediction that patients should perform relatively well, compared to controls, on FC-OLAP tests. Furthermore, the patients' excellent performance on these tests despite having hippocampal lesions, coupled with the fact that the tests used novel pairings, provides clear evidence that cortex is capable of forming new conjunctive rep-resentations (that are strong enough to support recognition, if not recall) after a single study exposure. One caveat is that, while MTLC appears capable of supporting good associative recognition performance when the to-be-associated stimuli are the same kind (e.g., words), it performs less well when the to-be-associated stimuli are of different kinds (e.g., objects and locations; Holdstock et al., 2002; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997) . Holdstock et al. (2002) argue that MTLC familiarity can not support object-location associative recognition because object and location information do not converge fully in MTLC.
As a final note: While the studies discussed above found patterns of spared and impaired recognition performance after focal hippocampal damage that are consistent with the model's predictions, it is important to keep in mind that many studies have found an "acrossthe-board" impairment in declarative memory tasks following hippocampal damage. For example, Stark and Squire (2002) found that patients with hippocampal damage were impaired to a roughly equal extent on tests with novel vs. re-paired lures. We address the question of why some hippocampal patients show "across-the-board" vs. selective deficits in Simulation 8, below.
Simulation 6: Interference and List Strength
We now turn to the fundamental issue of interference: How does studying an item affect recognition of other, previously studied items? In this section, we first review general principles of interference in networks like ours that incorporate Hebbian LTP and LTD. We then show how a list strength interference manipulation (described in detail below) differentially affects discrimination based on hippocampal recall vs. MTLC familiarity.
General Principles of Interference in our Models
At the most general level, interference occurs in our models whenever different input patterns have overlapping internal representations. In this situation, studying a new pattern tunes the overlapping units so they are more sensitive to the new pattern, and less sensitive to the unique (discriminative) features of other patterns. Figure 18 is a simple illustration of this tuning process. It shows a network with a single hidden unit that receives input from five input units. Initially, the hidden unit is activated to a roughly equal extent by two different input patterns, A and B. Studying pattern A has two effects: Hebbian LTP increases weights to active input features, and Hebbian LTD decrements weights to inactive input features. These changes bolster the extent to which pattern A activates the hidden unit. The effects of learning on responding to pattern B are more complex: LTP boosts weights to features that are shared by patterns A and B, but LTD reduces weights to features that are unique to pattern B. If you train a network of this type on a large number of overlapping patterns (e.g., several pictures of fish), the network will become more and more sensitive to features that are shared across the entire item set (e.g., the fact that all studied stimuli have fins), and it will become less and less responsive to discriminative features of individual stimuli (e.g., the fact that one fish has a large green striped dorsal fin). In the long run, this latter effect is harmful to recognition performance -if the network's sensitivity to the unique, discriminative features of studied items and lures hits floor, then the network will not be able to respond differentially to studied items and lures at test. However, in the absence of floor effects, the extent to which recognition is harmed depends on the extent to which interference differentially affects responding to studied items and lures. In the next section, we explore this issue in the context of our two models.
List Strength Simulations
We begin our exploration of interference by simulating how list strength affects recognition in the two models; specifically, how does strengthening some list items affect recognition of other (non-strengthened) list items? ) to facilitate comparison across models. For low-to-moderate levels of overlap (up to .26), there was a significant list strength effect in the hippocampal model but not in the cortical model; for higher levels of overlap there was a list strength effect in both models.
List Type
Target Items Interference Items weak interf.:
bike robot apple cat tree towel strong interf.: bike robot apple cat tree towel cat tree towel cat tree towel 
Methods
In our list strength simulations, we compared two conditions: a weak interference condition and a strong interference condition. In the weak interference condition, participants study target items once and interference items once. The strong interference condition is the same except interference items are strengthened at study (e.g., by presenting them multiple times, or presenting them for a longer duration). In both conditions, participants have to discriminate between target items and nonstudied lures at test. If strengthening of interference items (in the strong interference condition) impairs target vs. lure discrimination, relative to the weak interference condition, this is a list strength effect. A simple diagram of the procedure is provided in Table 1 .
The study list was comprised of 10 target items, followed by 10 interference items. Interference item strength was manipulated by increasing the learning rate for these items (from .01 to .02). In our models, strengthening by repetition and strengthening by increasing the learning rate have qualitatively similar effects; however, quantitatively, repetition has a larger effect on weights (e.g., doubling the number of presentations leads to more weight change than doubling the learning rate), because the initial study presentation alters how active units will be on the next presentation, and greater activity leads to greater learning (according to the Hebb rule). We also manipulated average between-item overlap (ranging from 10% to 50%) to see how this factor interacts with list strength -intuitively, increasing overlap should increase interference.
Results
In our cortical network simulations (Figure 19a ), there was no effect of list strength on recognition when input pattern overlap was relatively low (up to .26), but the list strength effect (LSE) was significant for higher levels of input overlap. In contrast, the hippocampal network showed a significant LSE for all levels of input overlap ( Figure 19b) ; the size of the hippocampal LSE increased with increasing overlap (except in the .5 overlap condition, where the LSE was compressed by floor effects). Figure 19c directly compares the size of the LSE in the two models.
We also measured the direct effect of strengthening interference items on memory for those items; both models exhibited a robust item strength effect whereby memory for interference items was better in the strong interference condition (e.g., for 20% input overlap, interference-item ¡ increased from 2.13 to 3.22 in the hippocampal model; in the cortical model, ¡ increased from 2.08 to 3.12), thereby confirming that our strengthening manipulation was effective.
The data are puzzling: For moderate amounts of overlap, the hippocampus shows an interference effect despite its ability to carry out pattern separation, and cor- tex -which has higher baseline levels of pattern overlap -does not show an interference effect. We address the hippocampal results first.
Interference in the Hippocampal Model
Understanding the hippocampal list strength effect is quite straightforward. Even though there is less overlap between representations in the hippocampus than in cortex, there is still some overlap (primarily in CA1, but also in CA3). These overlapping units cause interference -specifically, recall of discriminative features of studied items is impaired through Hebbian LTD occurring in the CA3-CA1 projection and (to a lesser extent) in projections coming in to CA3. Importantly, for lowto-moderate levels of input pattern overlap, the amount of recall triggered by lures is at floor, and therefore it can not decrease as a function of interference. Putting these two points together, the net effect of interference is to move the studied distribution downwards towards the at-floor lure distribution, which increases the overlap between distributions and therefore impairs discriminability (Figure 20) .
Interference in the Cortical Model
Next, we need to explain why a LSE was not obtained in the cortical model (for low-to-moderate levels of input overlap). The critical difference between the cortical and hippocampal models is that lure familiarity is not at floor in the cortical network, thereby opening up the possibility that lure familiarity (as well as studied familiarity) might decrease as a function of interference. Discriminability is a function of the difference in studied and lure familiarity (as well as the variance of these distributions); therefore, if lure familiarity decreases as much as (or more) than studied familiarity as a function of interference, overall discriminability may be unaffected. This is in fact what occurs in the cortical model. Figure 21a shows how raw familiarity scores triggered by targets and lures change as a function of interference. Initially, both studied and lure familiarity decrease; this occurs because interference reduces weights to discriminative features of studied items and lures. There is also an interaction whereby lure representations degrade more quickly than studied representations, so the studied-lure gap in familiarity increases slightly (Figure 21b ; note that while the increase is numerically small, it is highly significant).
However, with more interference, the studied-lure gap in familiarity starts to decrease. This occurs because weights to discriminative features of lures begin to approach floor (and -as such -can not show any additional decrease as a function of interference). Also, raw familiarity scores start to increase; this occurs because, in addition to reducing weights to discriminative features, interference also boosts weights to shared item features. At first, the former effect outweighs the latter, and there is a net decrease in familiarity. However, when weights to discriminative features approach floor, these weights no longer decrease enough to offset the increase in weights to shared features, and there is a net increase in familiarity. In this simulation, list strength did not substantially affect the variance of the familiarity signal; variance increased numerically with increasing list strength but the increase was extremely small (e.g., 10x strengthening of the 10 interference items led to a 3% increase in variance). However, we can not rule out the possibility that adding other forms of variability to the model (and eliminating sampling variability; see the Sources of Variability section) might alter the model's predictions about how list strength affects variance.
Differentiation
The finding that lure representations initially degrade faster than studied representations can be explained in terms of the principle of differentiation, which was first articulated by Shiffrin et al. (1990) ; see also McClelland and Chappell (1998) . Shiffrin et al. argued that studying an item makes its memory representation more selective, such that the representation is less likely to be activated by other items.
In our model, differentiation is a simple consequence of Hebbian learning (as it is in McClelland & Chappell, 1998). As discussed above, Hebbian learning tunes MTLC units so that they are more sensitive to the studied input pattern (because of LTP), and less sensitive to other, dissimilar input patterns (because of LTD). Because of this LTD effect, studied-item representations are less likely to be activated by interference items than lureitem representations; as such, studied items suffer less interference than lures. As an example of how studying an item pulls its representation away from other items, in the 20% input overlap simulations the average amount of MTLC overlap between studied target items and interference items (expressed in terms of vector dot product) was .150, whereas the average overlap between lures and interference items was .154; this difference was highly significant.
Boundary Conditions on the Null LSE
It should be clear from the above explanation that we do not always expect a null list strength effect for MTLC familiarity. With enough interference, the cortical model's overall sensitivity to discriminative features always approaches floor and the studied and lure familiarity distributions converge. The amount of overlap between items determines how quickly the network arrives at this degenerate state -more overlap yields faster degeneration. When overlap is high, raw familiarity scores increase (and the familiarity gap decreases) right from the start; this is illustrated in Figure 22 , which plots target and lure familiarity as a function of list strength, for 40.5% input overlap.
Tests of the Model's Predictions
The main novel prediction from our models is that (modulo the boundary conditions outlined above) recognition based on hippocampal recall should exhibit a LSE, whereas recognition based on MTLC familiarity should not.
Consistent with the hippocampal model's prediction, some studies have found a LSE for cued recall (e.g., Kahana & Rizzuto, submitted; Ratcliff et al., 1990 ) although not all studies that have looked for a cued recall LSE have found one (e.g., Bauml, 1997) . However, practically all published studies that have looked for a LSE for recognition have failed to find one Murnane & Shiffrin, 1991a , 1991b Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 1992; Yonelinas, Hockley, & Murdock, 1992; Shiffrin, Huber, & Marinelli, 1995) . Although this null LSE for recognition is consistent with our cortical model's predictions (viewed in isolation), it is nevertheless somewhat surprising that overall recognition scores do not reflect the hippocampal model's tendency to produce a recognition LSE.
One way to reconcile the null LSE for recognition with the model's predictions is to argue that hippocampal recall was not making enough of a contribution, relative to MTLC familiarity, on existing tests. This explanation leads to a clear prediction: List strength effects should be obtained for recognition tests and measures that load more heavily on the recall process. Norman (in press) tested this prediction in two distinct ways.
Self-Report Measures
In one experiment, Norman (in press) collected selfreport measures of recall and familiarity -whenever a participant called an item "old", there were asked whether they specifically "remembered" details from when the item was studied, whether the item just seemed "familiar". To estimate recall-based discrimination, we plugged the probability of saying "remember" to studied items and lures into the formula for ¡ . We computed familiarity-based discrimination using the Independence Remember-Know technique described in Jacoby, Yonelinas, and Jennings (1997) .
Norman (in press) found that the effect of list strength on old/new recognition sensitivity was nonsignificant in this experiment, replicating the null LSE obtained by Ratcliff et al. (1990) . However, if you break recognition into its component processes, it is clear that list strength does affect performance ( Figure 23 ). As predicted, there was a significant LSE for discrimination based on recall; in contrast, list strength had no effect whatsoever on familiarity-based discrimination.
2 We 2 Norman (in press) did not report how list strength affects should emphasize that the technique we used to estimate familiarity-based discrimination assumes that recall and familiarity are independent -the independence assumption is discussed in more detail in Simulation 7. Also, as discussed by Norman (in press), we can not conclusively rule out (in this case) the possibility that the observed LSE for recall-based discrimination was caused by shifting response bias, with no real change in sensitivity. Nonetheless, the overall pattern of results is highly consistent with the predictions of our model.
Lure Relatedness
Norman (in press) also looked at how list strength affects discrimination in the plurals paradigm (Hintzman et al., 1992) , where participants have to discriminate between studied words, related switched-plurality (SP) lures (e.g., study "scorpion", test "scorpions"), and unrelated lures. The model predicts that the ability to discriminate between studied words and related SP lures should depend on recall (see Simulation 3. Thus, we should find a significant list strength effect for studied vs. SP discrimination, but not necessarily for studied vs. unrelated discrimination, which can also be supported by familiarity.
Furthermore, we can also look at SP vs. unrelated pseudodiscrimination, i.e., how much more likely are participants to say old to related vs. unrelated lures. Familiarity boosts pseudodiscrimination (insofar as SP lures will be more familiar than unrelated lures), but recall of plurality information lowers pseudodiscrimination (by allowing participants to confidently reject SP lures). Hence, if increasing list strength reduces recall of plurality information (but has no effect familiarity-based discrimination) the net effect should be an increase in pseudodiscrimination (a negative LSE).
As predicted, the LSE for studied vs. SP lure discrimination was significant; the LSE for studied vs. unrelated lure discrimination was nonsignificant; and there was a significant negative LSE for SP lure vs. unrelated lure pseudodiscrimination (Figure 24 ).
In summary: We obtained data consistent with the model's prediction of a LSE for recall-based discrimination, and a null LSE for familiarity-based discrimination, using two very different methods of isolating the contributions of these processes (collecting self-report data, and using related lures). The model's predictions regarding the boundary conditions of the null LSE for familiarity-based discrimination remain to be tested. For example, our claim that discrimination asymptotically goes to zero with increasing list strength implies that it should be possible to obtain a LSE (in paradigms that familiarity-based discrimination -these results are being presented for the first time here. (an index of the area under the ROC curve; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991) . The graph plots the size of the list strength effect for three different kinds of discrimination: Studied vs. related switched-plurality lures (S vs. SP); studied vs. unrelated lures (S vs. U); and related vs. unrelated lure pseudodiscrimination (SP vs. U). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. There was a significant LSE for studied vs. related lure discrimination, and there was a significant negative LSE for related vs. unrelated lure pseudodiscrimination.
Effect of List Strength on Discrimination of
have previously yielded a null LSE) by increasing the number of training trials for interference items.
List Length Effects
Thus far, our interference simulations have focused on list strength. Here, we briefly discuss how list length affects performance in the two models. In contrast to the list strength paradigm, which measures how strengthening items already on the list interferes with memory for other items, the list length paradigm measures how adding new (previously nonstudied) items to the list interferes with memory for other items.
The basic finding is that our model, as currently configured, makes the same predictions regarding list length and strength effects -adding new items and strengthening already-presented items induce a comparable amount of weight change and therefore result in comparable levels of interference. As with list strength, the model predicts a dissociation whereby (so long as overlap between items is not too high) list length affects discrimination based on hippocampal recall but not MTLC familiarity. Yonelinas (1994) obtained evidence consistent with this prediction using the process dissociation procedure (which assumes independence).
However, some extant evidence appears to contradict the model's prediction of parallel effects of list length and list strength. In particular, Murnane and Shiffrin (1991a) and others have obtained a dissociation whereby list length impairs recognition sensitivity but a closely matched list strength manipulation does not. This finding implies that adding new items to the list is more disruptive to existing weight patterns than repeating alreadystudied items. We are currently exploring different ways of implementing this dynamic in our model.
Fast Weights
One particularly promising approach is to add a large, transient fast weight component to the model that reaches its maximum value in one study trial and then decays exponentially; subsequent presentations of the same item simply reset fast weights to their maximum value, and decay begins again (see Hinton & Plaut, 1987 for an early implementation of a similar mechanism). This dynamic is consistent with neurobiological evidence showing a large, transient component to long-term potentiation (LTP) (e.g., Malenka & Nicoll, 1993; Bliss & Collingridge, 1993) .
The assumptions outlined above imply that the magnitude of fast weights at test (for a particular item) will be a function of the time elapsed from the most recent presentation of the item; the number of times that the item was repeated before this final presentation does not matter. As such, presenting interference items for the first time (increasing list length) should have a large effect on fast weights, but repeating already-studied interference items (increasing list strength) should have less of an effect on the configuration of fast weights at test. Preliminary cortical-model simulations incorporating fast weights (in addition to standard, non-decaying weights) have shown a list length/strength dissociation, but more work is needed to explore the relative merits of different implementations of fast weights (e.g., should the fast weight component incorporate LTD as well as LTP), and how the presence of fast weights interacts with the other predictions outlined in this paper.
The idea that list length effects are attributable to quickly decaying weights implies that interposing a delay between study and test (thereby allowing the fast weights to decay) should greatly diminish the list length effect. In keeping with this prediction, a recent study with a 5 minute delay between study and test did not show a list length effect (Dennis & Humphreys, 2001 ). The next step in testing this hypothesis will be to run experiments that parametrically manipulate study-test lag while measuring list length effects.
Simulation 7: The Combined Model and the Independence Assumption
Up to this point, we have explored the properties of hippocampal recall and MTLC familiarity by presenting input patterns to separate hippocampal and neocortical networks -this approach is useful for analytically mapping out how the two networks respond to different inputs, but it does not allow us to explore interactions between the two networks. One important question that cannot be addressed using separate networks is the statistical relationship between recall and familiarity. As mentioned several times throughout this paper, all extant techniques for measuring the distinct contributions of recall and familiarity to recognition performance assume that they are stochastically independent (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1997). This assumption can not be directly tested using behavioral data because of the chicken-andegg problems described in the Introduction.
To assess the validity of the independence assumption, we implemented a combined model in which the cortical system serves as the input to the hippocampus -this arrangement more accurately reflects how the two systems are connected in the brain. Using the combined model, we show that there is no simple answer regarding whether or not hippocampal recall and MTLC familiarity are independent. Rather, the extent to which these processes are correlated is a function of different (situationally varying) factors, some of which boost the correlation and some of which reduce the correlation. In this section, we briefly describe the architecture of the combined model, and then we use the model to explore two manipulations that push the recall-familiarity correlation in opposite directions: encoding variability and interference (list length).
Combined Model Architecture
The combined model is structurally identical to the hippocampal model except the projection from Input to EC in has modifiable connections (and 25% random connectivity) instead of fixed 1-to-1 connectivity. Thus, the Input-to-EC in part of the combined model has the same basic architecture and connectivity as the separate cortical model. This makes it possible to read out our ¢ ¡ £ ¤ ¦ ¥ § familiarity measure from the EC in layer of the combined model (i.e., the EC in layer of the combined model serves the same functional role as the MTLC layer of the separate cortical network). There are, however, a few small differences between the cortical part of the combined model, and the separate cortical network. First, the EC in layer of the combined model is constrained to learn "slotted" representations, where only one unit in each 10-unit slot is strongly ac- ability on the recall-familiarity correlation for studied items. As encoding variability (operationalized as the probability that participants will "blink" and fail to encode half of an item's features at study) increases, the recall-familiarity correlation increases.
tive; limiting the range of possible EC representations makes it easier for the hippocampus to learn a stable mapping between CA1 representations and EC representations. Second, the EC in layer for the combined model only has 240 units, compared to 1920 units in the MTLC layer of the separate cortical network. This reduced size derives from computational necessity -use of a larger EC in would require a larger CA1, which together would make the simulations run too slowly on current hardware. This smaller hidden layer in the combined model makes the familiarity signal more subject to sampling variability, and thus recognition ¢ ¡ is somewhat worse, but otherwise it functions just as before. We used the same basic cortical and hippocampal parameters as in our separate-network simulations, except we used input patterns with 32.5% overlap -this level of input overlap yields approximately 24% overlap between EC in patterns at study.
In the combined model, the absolute size of the recall-familiarity correlation is likely to be inflated, relative to the brain, because of the high level of sampling variability present in our model. Sampling variability leads to random fluctuations in the sharpness of cortical representations, which induce a correlation (insofar as sharper representations trigger larger familiarity scores, and they also propagate better into the hippocampus, bolstering recall). Because of this issue, our simulations below focus on identifying manipulations that affect the size of the correlation, rather than characterizing the absolute size of the correlation. Curran and Hintzman (1995) pointed out that encoding variability can boost the recall-familiarity correlation; if items vary substantially in how well they are encoded, poorly-encoded items will be unfamiliar and will not be recalled; well-encoded items will be more familiar, and more likely to trigger recall. We ran simulations in the combined model where we manipulated encoding variability by varying the probability of partial encoding failure (i.e., encoding only half of an item's features) from 0 to .50. For each simulated participant, we read out the MTLC familiarity signal (
Effects of Encoding Variability
, read out from the EC in layer) and the hippocampal recall signal (
between EC out and EC in) on each trial, and measured the correlation between these signals (across trials). The results of these simulations are presented in Figure 25 ; as expected, increasing encoding variability increased the recall-familiarity correlation in the model.
Interference Induced Decorrelation
In the next set of simulations, we show how the presence of interference between memory traces can reduce the recall-familiarity correlation. In the Interference and List Strength section of the paper, we discussed how the two systems are differentially affected by interference: Hippocampal recall scores for studied items tend to decrease with interference; familiarity scores decrease less, and sometimes increase, because increased sensitivity to shared prototype features compensates for lost sensitivity to discriminative item-specific features. Insofar as items vary in how much interference they are subject to (due to random differences in between-item overlap), and interference pushes recall and familiarity in different directions, it should be possible to use interference as a "wedge" to decorrelate recall and familiarity.
We ran simulations measuring how the recallfamiliarity correlation changed as a function of interference (operationalized using a list length manipulation). There were 10 target items followed by 0 to 150 (nontested) interference items. As expected, increasing list length lowers the recall-familiarity correlation for studied items (Figure 26a ) in the model.
We can get further insight into these results by looking at how interference affects raw familiarity and recall scores for studied items in these simulations (Figure 26b) . With increasing interference, recall decreases sharply but familiarity stays relatively constant; this differential effect of interference works to de-correlate the two signals. Once recall approaches floor, recall and familiarity are affected in a basically similar manner (i.e., not much); this lack of a differential effect explains why the recall-familiarity correlation does not continue to decrease all the way to zero.
In summary: The combined model gives us a principled means of predicting how different factors will affect the statistical relationship between recall and familiarity. Given the tight coupling of the cortical and hippocampal networks in the combined model, one might think that a positive correlation is inevitable. However, the results presented here show that -to a first approximation -independence can be achieved, so long as factors that reduce the correlation (e.g., interference) exert more of an influence than factors that bolster the correlation (e.g., encoding variability). Future research will focus on identifying additional factors that affect the size of the correlation.
Simulation 8: Lesion Effects in the Combined Model
In this section, we show how the combined model can provide a more sophisticated understanding of the effects of different kinds of medial temporal lesions. Specifically, we show that (in the combined model) partial hippocampal lesions can sometimes result in worse overall recognition performance than complete hippocampal lesions. In contrast, increasing MTLC lesion size monotonically reduces overall recognition performance.
Partial Lesion Simulation Methods
We ran one set of simulations exploring the effects of focal hippocampal lesions, and another set of simulations exploring the effects of focal MTLC lesions. In all of the lesion simulations, the size of the lesion (in terms of % of units removed) was varied from 0% to 95% in 5% increments. In the hippocampal lesion simulations, we lesioned all of the hippocampal subregions (DG, CA1, CA3) equally by percentage; in the MTLC lesion simulations, we lesioned EC in. To establish comparable baseline (pre-lesion) recognition performance between the hippocampal and cortical networks, we boosted the cortical learning rate to .012 instead of .004; this increase compensates for the high amount of sampling variability present in the (240 unit) EC in layer of the combined model. In these simulations, we used forced-choice testing to maximize comparability with animal lesion studies that used this format (e.g., Baxter & Murray, 2001b) .
To simulate overall recognition performance when both processes are contributing, we used a decision rule whereby if one item triggered a larger positive recall score (
than the other, then that item was selected; otherwise, if
, the decision falls back on familiarity. This rule incorporates the assumption (shared by other dual-process models, e.g., Jacoby et al., 1997 ) that recall takes precedence over familiarity. This differential weighting of recall can be justified in terms of our finding that, in normal circumstances, hippocampal recall in the CLS model is more diagnostic than MTLC familiarity. Furthermore, it is supported by data showing that recall is associated with higher average recognition confidence ratings than (FC) recognition performance. This graph plots FC accuracy based on MTLC familiarity, hippocampal recall, and a combination of the two signals, as a function of hippocampal lesion size. FC accuracy based on MTLC familiarity is unaffected by hippocampal lesion size. FC accuracy based on hippocampal recall declines steadily as lesion size increases. FC accuracy based on a combination of recall and familiarity is affected in a nonmonotonic fashion by lesion size: initially, combined FC accuracy declines; however, going from a 75% to 100% hippocampal lesion leads to an increase in combined FC performance.
familiarity (e.g., Yonelinas, 2001b) . Figure 27 shows how hippocampal FC performance, cortical FC performance, and combined FC performance (using the decision rule just described) vary as a function of hippocampal lesion size. As one might expect, hippocampal FC performance decreases steadily as a function of hippocampal lesion size, while cortical performance is unaffected by hippocampal damage (insofar as familiarity is computed before activity feeds into the hippocampus). The most interesting result is that hippocampal lesion size has a nonmonotonic effect on combined recognition performance. At first, combined FC accuracy decreases with increasing hippocampal lesion size; however, going from a 75% to 100% hippocampal lesion actually improves combined FC performance.
Hippocampal Lesions
Why is recognition performance worse for partial (75%) vs. complete lesions? The key to understanding this finding is that partial hippocampal damage impairs the hippocampus' ability to carry out pattern separation. We assume that lesioning a layer lowers the total number of units, but does not decrease the number of active units; accordingly, representations become less sparse and the average amount of overlap between patterns increases. There is neurobiological support for this assumption: In 
score, as a as a function of hippocampal lesion size. For studied items, the probability declines monotonically as a function of lesion size. For lures, the probability first increases, then decreases, as a function of lesion size. the brain, the activity of excitatory pyramidal neurons is regulated primarily by inhibitory interneurons (Douglas & Martin, 1990) ; assuming that both excitatory and inhibitory neurons are damaged by lesions, this loss of inhibition is likely to result in a proportional increase in activity for the remaining excitatory neurons.
Pattern separation failure (induced by partial damage) results in a sharp increase in the amount of recall triggered by lures. Combined recognition performance in these participants suffers because the noisy recall signal drowns out useful information that is present in the familiarity signal. Moving from a partial hippocampal lesion to a complete lesion improves performance by removing this source of noise. Figure 28 provides direct support for the "noisy hippocampus" theory; it shows how the probability that lures will trigger a positive
score increases steadily with increasing hippocampal lesion size until it reaches a peak of .41 (for 55% hippocampal damage). However, as lesion size approaches 60%, the probability that lures and studied items will trigger a positive
score starts to decrease. This occurs for two reasons: First, because of pattern separation failure in CA3, all items start to trigger recall of the same prototypical features (which mismatch item-specific features of the test probe); second, CA1 damage reduces the hippocampus' ability to translate CA3 activity into the target EC pattern. As the number of items triggering positive
scores decreases, control of the recognition decision reverts to familiarity. This benefits recognition performance insofar as familiarity does a better job of discriminating between studied items and lures than the recall signal generated by the lesioned hip- pocampus.
MTLC Lesions
Turning to the effects of MTLC lesions, we find that lesioning EC in hurts both cortical and hippocampal recognition performance (Figure 29) . Therefore, combined recognition performance decreases steadily as a function of MTLC lesion size. The observed deficits result from the fact that overlap between EC in patterns increases with lesion size -this has a direct adverse effect on cortically-based discrimination; furthermore, because EC in serves as the input layer for the hippocampus, increased EC in overlap leads to increased hippocampal overlap, which hurts recall.
Relevant Data and Implications
The simulation results reported above are consistent with the results of a recent meta-analysis conducted by Baxter and Murray (2001b) . This meta-analysis incorporated results from several studies that have looked at hippocampal and perirhinal (MTLC) lesion effects on recognition in monkeys using a delayed-nonmatching-tosample (DNMS) paradigm. Baxter and Murray (2001b) found, in keeping with our results, that partial hippocampal lesions can lead to larger recognition deficits than more complete lesions -in the meta-analysis, hippocampal lesion size and recognition impairment were negatively correlated. The Baxter and Murray metaanalysis also found that perirhinal lesion size and recog-nition impairment were positively correlated, just as we found that MTLC lesion size and impairment were correlated in our simulations.
Baxter and Murray's results are highly controversial; Zola and Squire (2001) re-analyzed the data in the Baxter and Murray meta-analysis, using a different set of statistical techniques that control, e.g., for differences in mean lesion size across studies, and found that the negative correlation between hippocampal lesion size and impairment reported by Baxter and Murray (2001b) was no longer significant (although there was still a nonsignificant trend in this direction; see Baxter & Murray, 2001a for further discussion of this issue). Our results contribute to this debate by providing a novel and principled account of how a negative correlation might come into being, in terms of pattern separation failure resulting in a noisy recall signal that participants nevertheless rely upon when making recognition judgments. Of course, our account is not the only way of explaining why partial hippocampal lesions might impair recognition more than complete lesions. Another possibility, suggested by Mumby, Wood, Duva, Kornecook, Pinel, and Phillips (1996) , is that a damaged hippocampus might disrupt neocortical processing via epileptiform activity.
The results reported here speak to the debate over why hippocampally lesioned patients sometimes show relatively spared recognition performance on standard recognition tests with unrelated lures, and sometimes do not. The model predicts that patients with relatively complete hippocampal lesions (that nonetheless spare MTLC) should show relatively spared performance, and patients with smaller hippocampal lesions (that reduce the diagnosticity of recall without eliminating the signal outright) should show an "across-the-board" declarative memory deficit without any particular sparing of recognition. This view implies that the range of etiologies that produce selective sparing should be quite narrow: If the lesion is too small, you end with a partially-lesioned hippocampus that injects noise into the recognition process; if the lesion is too large, then you hit perirhinal cortex (in addition to the hippocampus) and this leads to deficits in familiarity-based recognition.
General Discussion
In this section of the paper, we review how our modeling work speaks to extant debates over how to characterize the respective contributions of recall (vs. familiarity) and hippocampus (vs. MTLC) to recognition. Next, we compare our model to other neurally-inspired and abstract computational models of recognition. We conclude by discussing limitations of the models and future directions for research.
Implications for Theories of How Recall Contributes to Recognition
As discussed in the Introduction, the dual-process approach to recognition has become increasingly prevalent in recent years, but this enterprise is based on a weak foundation. Yonelinas, Jacoby, and their colleagues have developed several techniques for measuring the contributions of recall and familiarity based on behavioral data, but these techniques rely on a core set of assumptions that have not been tested; furthermore, some of these assumptions (e.g., independence) can not be tested based on behavioral data alone, because of chicken-and-egg problems.
More specifically, measurement techniques such as process dissociation and ROC analysis are built around dual-process signal detection theory (Jacoby et al., 1997; Yonelinas, 2001b) . In addition to the independence assumption, this theory assumes that familiarity is a Gaussian signal-detection process, but recall is a dual highthreshold process (i.e., recall is all-or-none; studied items are sometimes recalled as being "old", but lures never are; lures are sometimes recalled as being "new", but studied items never are). The CLS model does not assume any of the above claims to be true -rather, its core assumptions are based on the functional properties of hippocampus vs. MTLC. As such, we can use the CLS model to evaluate the validity of dual-process signal-detection theory.
Results from our cortical model are generally consistent with the idea that familiarity is a Gaussian signaldetection process. In contrast, results from our hippocampal model are not consistent with the idea that recall is a high-threshold process -recall in our model is not all-or-none, and lures sometimes trigger abovezero recall. Our claim that lures can trigger some matching recall, and that the number of recalled details varies from item to item, is consistent with the Source Monitoring Framework set forth by Marcia Johnson and her colleagues (e.g., Mitchell & Johnson, 2000) .
Although the recall process in our model is not strictly high-threshold, it is not Gaussian either. If overlap between stimuli is not too high, our recall process is approximately consistent with dual-high-threshold theory, in the sense that (for a given experiment) there is a level of matching recall that is sometimes exceeded by studied items, but not by lures, and there is a level of mismatching recall that is sometimes exceeded by lures, but not by studied items. Furthermore, we assume that participants routinely set their recall criterion high enough to avoid false recognition of unrelated lures, and that participants set their criterion for recall-to-reject high enough to avoid incorrect rejection of studied items. As such, the model provides some support (conditional on overlap not being too high) for Yonelinas' claim that lures will not be called "old" based on recall, and that studied items will not be called "new" based on recall.
Regarding the independence assumption: As mentioned earlier, Curran and Hintzman (1995) and others have criticized this assumption on the grounds that some degree of encoding variability is likely to be present in any experiment, and encoding variability results in a positive recall-familiarity correlation. Our results confirm this latter conclusion, but they also show that interference reduces the recall-familiarity correlation. As such, it is possible to achieve independence (assuming there is enough interference) even when encoding variability is present.
Overall, although the details of the CLS model's predictions are not strictly consistent with the assumptions behind dual-process signal detection theory, it is safe to say that the CLS model's predictions are broadly consistent with these assumptions; accordingly, we would expect measurement techniques that rely on these assumptions to yield meaningful results most of the time. The main contribution of the CLS model is to establish boundary conditions on the validity of these assumptions -e.g., the assumption that lures will not be called "old" based on recall does not hold true when there is extensive overlap between stimuli, and the independence assumption is more likely to hold true in situations where interference is high and encoding variability is low than when the opposite is true.
Implications for Theories of How the Hippocampus (vs. MTLC) Contributes to Recognition
To a first approximation, the CLS model resembles the neuropsychological theory of episodic memory set forth by Aggleton and Brown (1999) (A&B) -both theories posit that the hippocampus is essential for recall and that MTLC can support judgments of stimulus familiarity on its own. However, this resemblance is only superficial. As discussed in the Introduction, simply linking "recall" and "familiarity" to hippocampus and MTLC, without further specifying how these processes work, does not allow us to predict when recognition will be impaired or spared after hippocampal damage. Everything depends on how you unpack the terms "recall" and "familiarity", and the CLS and A&B theories unpack these terms in completely different ways.
The A&B theory unpacks recall and familiarity in terms of a simple, verbally stated dichotomy whereby recall is necessary for forming new associations but familiarity is sufficient for item recognition. In contrast to the A&B theory, the CLS model grounds its conception of recall and familiarity in terms of very specific ideas about the neurocomputational properties of hippocampus and MTLC. Moreover, we have implemented these ideas in a working computational model that can be used to test their sufficiency and generate novel predictions.
According to the CLS model, practically all differences between cortical and hippocampal contributions to recognition can be traced back to graded differences in how information is represented in these structures. For example, the fact that hippocampal representations are more sparse than cortical representations in our model implies that hippocampal recall will be more sensitive to conjunctions than MTLC familiarity, but crucially both signals should show some sensitivity to conjunctions (see Simulation 5 for more discussion of this point). This graded approach makes it possible for the CLS model to explain dissociations within simple categories like "memory for new associations" -for example, the finding from Mayes et al. (2001) that hippocampally-lesioned patient YR sometimes shows intact FC word-word associative recognition (presumably, based on MTLC familiarity) despite being impaired at cued recall of newly learned paired associates see Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997 for a similar pattern of results). As discussed earlier, these dissociations are problematic for A&B's "item" vs. "associative" dichotomy.
Lastly, we should mention an important commonality between the CLS model and the A&B theory: Both theories predict sparing of item recognition (with unrelated lures) relative to recall in patients with complete hippocampal lesions. While some studies have found this pattern of results in patients with focal hippocampal damage (e.g., Mayes et al., 2002) , it is potentially quite problematic for both models that other studies have found roughly equivalent deficits in recognition (with unrelated lures) and recall following focal hippocampal damage (e.g., Manns & Squire, 1999) . We do not claim to fully understand why some hippocampally-lesioned patients show relatively spared item recognition but others do not. However, it may be possible to account for some of this variability in terms of the idea, set forth by Baxter and Murray (2001b) and explored in Simulation 8, that partial hippocampal lesions are especially harmful to recognition. This idea is still highly controversial and needs to be tested directly, using experiments that carry out careful, parametric manipulations of lesion size (controlling for other factors like lesion technique and task).
Comparison with Abstract Computational Models of Recognition
Whereas our model incorporates explicit claims about how different brain structures (hippocampus and MTLC) support recognition memory, most computational models of recognition memory are abstract in the sense that they do not make specific claims about how recognition is implemented in the brain. The REM model presented by Shiffrin and Steyvers (1997) represents the state of the art in abstract modeling of recognition memory (see McClelland & Chappell, 1998 for a very similar model). REM carries out a Bayesian computation of the likelihood that an ideal observer should say "old" to an item, based on the extent to which that item matches (and mismatches) stored memory traces. Our cortical familiarity model resembles REM and other abstract models in several respects: Like the abstract models, our cortical model computes a scalar that tracks the "global match" between the test probe and stored memory traces; furthermore, both our cortical model and models like REM posit that differentiation contributes to the null LSE. Thus, our modeling work relies critically on insights that were developed in the context of abstract models like REM.
We can also draw a number of contrasts between the CLS model and abstract Bayesian models. One major difference is that our model posits that two processes (with distinct operating characteristics) contribute to recognition whereas abstract models attempt to explain recognition data in terms of a single familiarity process. Another difference is that -in our model -interference occurs at study, when one item re-uses weights that are also used by another item, whereas REM posits that memory traces are stored in a non-interfering fashion, and that interference arises at test, whenever the test item spuriously matches memory traces corresponding to other items.
The question of whether interference occurs at study (or only at test) has a long history in memory research. Other models that posit structural interference at study have found large and sometimes excessive effects of interference on recognition sensitivity. For example, Ratcliff (1990) presented a model consisting of a 3-layer feedforward network that learns to reproduce input patterns in the output layer; the dependent measure at test is how well the recalled (output) pattern matches the input. Like our hippocampal model, the Ratcliff model shows interference effects on recognition sensitivity because recall of discriminative features of lures is at floor; as such, any decrease in studied recall necessarily pushes the studied and lure recall distributions closer together. The Ratcliff model generally shows more interference than our hippocampal model because there is more overlap between "hidden" representations in the Ratcliff model vs. in our hippocampal model.
Based on these results (and others like them), Murnane and Shiffrin (1991a) concluded that interferenceat-study models may be incapable of explaining the null recognition LSE obtained by Ratcliff et al. (1990) . An important implication of the work presented here is that interference-at-study models do not always show excessive effects of interference on recognition sensitivity; our cortical model predicts a null recognition LSE because increasing list strength reduces lure familiarity slightly more than studied-item familiarity, so the studied-lure gap in familiarity is preserved.
In this paper, we have focused on describing qualitative model predictions, and the boundary conditions of these predictions. Working at this level, it is clear that there are some fundamental differences in the predictions of the CLS model vs. models like REM. Because studying one item degrades the memory traces of other items, our model predicts -regardless of parameter settings -that the curve relating interference (e.g., list length or list strength) to recognition sensitivity will always asymptotically go to zero with increasing interference. In contrast, in REM it is possible to completely eliminate the deleterious effects of interference items on performance through differentiation; if interference items are presented often enough, they could become so strongly differentiated that the odds of them spuriously matching a test item are effectively zero; whether or not this actually happens depends on model parameters.
Comparison with Other Neural Network Models of Hippocampal and Cortical Contributions to Recognition

Models of Hippocampus
The hippocampal component of the CLS model is part of a long tradition of hippocampal modeling (e.g., Marr, 1971; McNaughton & Morris, 1987; Rolls, 1989; Levy, 1989; Touretzky & Redish, 1996; Burgess & O'Keefe, 1996; Wu, Baxter, & Levy, 1996; Treves & Rolls, 1994; Moll & Miikkulainen, 1997; Hasselmo & Wyble, 1997) . Although different hippocampal models may differ slightly in the functions they ascribe to particular hippocampal subcomponents, a remarkable consensus has emerged regarding how the hippocampus supports episodic memory (i.e., by assigning minimally overlapping CA3 representations to different episodes, with recurrent connectivity serving to bind together the constituent features of those episodes). In the present modeling work, we build on this shared foundation by applying these biologically-based computational modeling ideas to a rich domain of human memory data (for an application of the same basic model to animal learning data, see .
The Hasselmo and Wyble (1997) model (hereafter, H&W) deserves special consideration because it is the only one of the aforementioned hippocampal models that has been used to simulate patterns of behavioral listlearning data. The architecture of this model is generally similar to the architecture of the CLS hippocampal model, except H&W make a distinction between item and (shared) context information, and posit that item and context information are kept separate throughout the entire hippocampal processing pathway, except in CA3 where recurrent connections allow for item-context associations; furthermore, in the H&W model recognition is based on the extent to which item representations trigger recall of shared contextual information associated with the study list. The H&W model predicts that recognition of studied items should be robust to factors that degrade hippocampal processing because -insofar as all studied items have the same "context vector" -the CA3 representation of shared context information will be very strong and thus easy to activate. However, the fact that the CA3 context representation is easy to activate implies that related lures will very frequently trigger false alarms in the H&W model (in contrast to the CLS model, which predicts low hippocampal false alarms to related lures). The H&W model also predicts a null list strength effect for hippocampally-driven recognition, and a null main effect of item strength on hippocampally-driven recognition (in contrast to our model, which predicts that both item strength and list strength effects should be obtained in the hippocampus). Thus, because H&W use a different hippocampal recognition measure, and separate item and context representations, their model generates recognition predictions that are very different from the CLS hippocampal model's predictions. However, we should emphasize that, if H&W used the same recognition measure as our model (match -mismatch) and factored item recall as well as context recall into recognition decisions, their model and the CLS model would likely make very similar predictions because the two model architectures are so similar.
Models of Neocortical Contributions to Recognition Memory
In recent years, several models (besides ours) have been developed that address the role of MTLC in familiarity discrimination; see Bogacz and Brown (in press ) for a detailed comparison of the properties of different familiarity-discrimination models. Some of these models, like ours, posit that familiarity discrimination in cortex arises from Hebbian learning that tunes a population of units to respond strongly to the stimulus (e.g., Bogacz, Brown, & Giraud-Carrier, 2001; Sohal & Hasselmo, 2000) , although the details of these models differ from ours (for example, the Bogacz et al., 2001 and Sohal & Hasselmo, 2000 models posit that both homosynaptic Hebbian LTD -decrease weights if the sending unit is active but the receiving unit is not -and heterosynaptic Hebbian LTD -decrease weights if the receiving unit is active but the sending unit is not -are important for familiarity discrimination, whereas our model only incorporates heterosynaptic Hebbian LTD). Other models incorporate radically different mechanisms, e.g., anti-Hebbian learning that reduces connection strengths between active neurons (Bogacz & Brown, in press) .
One difference between the models proposed by Bogacz & Brown vs. our model is that -in the Bogacz & Brown models -familiarity is computed by a specialized population of novelty detector units that are not directly involved in extracting and representing stimulus features (see Bogacz & Brown, in press for a review of empirical evidence that supports this claim). In contrast, our combined model does not posit the existence of specialized novelty detector units; rather, the layer (EC in) where we read out the ¢ ¡ £ ¤ ¦ ¥ § familiarity signal contains the highest (most refined) cortical representation of the stimulus, which in turn serves as the input to the hippocampus.
We should note, however, that our model could easily be transformed into a model with specialized novelty detectors, without altering any of the predictions outlined in the main body of the paper. To do this, we could connect the input layer of the combined model directly to CA3, CA1, and DG, and we could have this input layer feed in parallel to a second cortical layer (with no connections to the hippocampus) where we compute
. The units in this second cortical layer could be labeled "specialized novelty detectors" insofar as they are not serving any other important function in the model. This change would not affect the functioning of the cortical part of the model in any way.
Having the same layer serve as the input to the "novelty detection" layer and the hippocampus could, in principle, affect the predictions of the combined model, but as a practical matter none of the combined model predictions outlined in Simulations 7 and 8 would be affected by this change. For example, if cortical units involved in computing novelty/familiarity were not involved in passing features to the hippocampus, then it would be possible in principle to disrupt familiarity for a particular stimulus without disrupting hippocampal recall of that stimulus (by lesioning the "novelty detector" units). However, this is probably not possible in practice -according to Brown and Xiang (1998) , perirhinal neurons involved in familiarity discrimination and stimulus representation are topographically interspersed, so lesions large enough to affect one population of neurons should also affect the other.
A major issue raised by Bogacz and Brown (in press ) is whether networks like ours that extract features via Hebbian learning have adequate capacity to explain our ability to discriminate between very large numbers of familiar and unfamiliar stimuli (e.g., Standing, 1973 found that people can discriminate between studied and nonstudied pictures after studying a list of thousands of pictures). Bogacz and Brown (in press ) argue that -even in a "brain-sized" version of our cortical model -the network's tendency to represent shared (prototypical) features at the expense of features that discriminate between items will result in unacceptably poor performance after studying large numbers of stimuli. Bogacz and Brown (in press) point out that the anti-Hebbian model that they propose does not have this problem; this model ignores features that are shared across patterns and, as such, has a much higher capacity. A possible problem with the anti-Hebbian model is that it may show too little interference. More research is needed to assess whether our network architecture, suitably scaled, can explain findings like Standing (1973) , and -if not -how it can be modified to accommodate this result (without eliminating its ability to explain interference effects on recognition discrimination).
At this point in time, it is difficult to directly compare our model's predictions to the predictions of other cortical familiarity models because the models have been applied to different data domains -we have focused on explaining detailed patterns of behavioral data, whereas the other models have focused on explaining single-cell recording data in monkeys. Bringing the different models to bear on the same data points is an important topic for future research. While the CLS model can not make detailed predictions about spiking patterns of single neurons, it does make predictions regarding how firing rates will change as a function of familiarity. For example, the model predicts that, for a particular stimulus, neurons that show decreased (vs. asymptotically strong) firing in response to repeated presentation of that stimulus should be neurons that initially had a less strong response to the stimulus (and therefore lost the competition to represent the stimulus).
Future Directions
Future research will address limitations of the model that were mentioned earlier. In the Sources of Variability section, we discussed how the model incorporates some sources of variability that we plan to remove (sampling variability) and lacks some sources of variability that we plan to add. Increases in computer processing speed will make it possible to grow our networks to the point where sampling variability is negligible, and we will replace lost sampling variability by adding encoding variability and variability in pre-experimental presentation frequency to the model. Including pre-experimental variability (by presenting test items in other contexts a variable number of times prior to the start of the experiment) will allow us to address a range of interesting phenomena, including the so-called frequency mirror effect, whereby hits tend to be higher for low-frequency (LF) stimuli than for high-frequency (HF) stimuli, but false alarms tend to be higher for HF stimuli than LF stimuli (see, e.g., Glanzer, Adams, Iverson, & Kim, 1993) ; recently, several studies have obtained evidence suggesting that recall is responsible for the LF hit-rate advantage and familiarity is responsible for the HF false-alarmrate advantage (Reder, Nhouyvanisvong, Schunn, Ayers, Angstadt, & Hiraki, 2000; Joordens & Hockley, 2000; Reder et al. also present an abstract dual-process model of this finding).
Furthermore, we plan to directly address the question of how participants make decisions based on recall and familiarity. Clearly, people are capable of employing a variety of different decision strategies that can differentially weight the different signals that emerge from the cortex and hippocampus. One way to address this issue is to conduct empirical Bayesian analyses to delineate how the optimal way of making recognition decisions in our model varies as a function of situational factors, and then compare the results of these analyses with participants' actual performance. A specific idea that we plan to explore in detail is that participants discount recall of prototype information, because prototype recall is much less diagnostic than item-specific recall. The frontal lobes may play an important part in this discounting process -for example, Curran, Schacter, Norman, and Galluccio (1997) studied a frontal-lesioned patient (BG) who false alarmed excessively to nonstudied items that were of the same general type as studied items; one way of explaining this finding is that BG has a selective deficit in discounting prototype recall. Thus, the literature on frontal lesion effects may provide important constraints on how recognition decision-making works, by showing how it breaks down.
Supplementing the model with a more principled theory of how participants make recognition decisions will make it possible for us to apply the model to a wider range of recognition phenomena, for example situations where recall and familiarity are placed in opposition (e.g., Jacoby, 1991) . We could also begin to address the rich literature on how different manipulations affect recognition ROC curves (e.g., Ratcliff et al., 1992; Yonelinas, 1994) .
Another topic for future research involves improving crosstalk between the model and neuroimaging data. In principle, we should be able to predict fMRI activations during episodic recognition tasks by reading out activation from different subregions of the model; to achieve this goal, we will need to build a "back end" onto the model that relates changes in (simulated) neuronal activity to changes in the hemodynamic response that is measured by fMRI. Finally, Curran (2000) has isolated what appear to be distinct ERP correlates of recall and familiarity; as such, we should be able to use the model to predict how these recall and familiarity waveforms will be affected by different manipulations. Our first attempt along these lines was successful; we found that -as predicted by the model -increasing list strength did not affect how well the ERP familiarity correlate discriminates between targets and lures, but list strength adversely affected how well the ERP recall correlate discriminates between targets and lures (Norman, Curran, & Tepe, in preparation) .
Alternate Dependent Measures
We also plan to explore other, more biologically plausible ways of reading out familiarity from the cortical network. While ¢ ¡ £ ¤ ¦ ¥ § has the virtue of being easy to compute, it is not immediately clear how some other structure in the brain could isolate the activity of only the winning units (because "losing" units are still active to some small extent, and there are many more losing units than winning units). One promising alternative measure is settle time: the time it takes for activity to spread through the network (more concretely, we measured the number of processing cycles needed for average activity in MTLC to reach a criterion value = .03). This measure exploits the fact that activity spreads more quickly for familiar vs. unfamiliar patterns. 
Conclusion
We have provided a comprehensive initial treatment of the domain of recognition memory using our biologically-based neural network model of the hippocampus and neocortex. This work extends a similarly comprehensive application of the same basic model to a range of animal learning phenomena ). Thus, we are encouraged by the breadth and depth of data that can be accounted for within our framework. Future work can build upon this foundation to address a range of other human and animal memory phenomena.
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Appendix A: Algorithm Details
This appendix describes the computational details of the algorithm that was used in the simulations. The algorithm is identical to the Leabra algorithm described in O' Reilly and Munakata (2000; O'Reilly, 1998) , except the error-driven-learning component of the Leabra algorithm was not used here; see Grossberg (1976) for a similar model. Interested readers should refer to O'Reilly and Munakata (2000) for more details regarding the algorithm and its historical precedents.
Pseudocode
The pseudocode for the algorithm that we used is given here, showing exactly how the pieces of the algorithm described in more detail in the subsequent sections fit together.
Outer loop: Iterate over events (trials) within an epoch. For each event, settle over cycles of updating:
1. At start of settling, for all units: (b) Increment the weights and apply contrastenhancement (eq 12).
Point Neuron Activation Function
Leabra uses a point neuron activation function that models the electrophysiological properties of real neurons, while simplifying their geometry to a single point. This function is nearly as simple computationally as the standard sigmoidal activation function, but the more biologically-based implementation makes it considerably easier to model inhibitory competition, as described below. Further, using this function enables cognitive models to be more easily related to more physiologically detailed simulations, thereby facilitating bridge-building between biology and cognition.
The membrane potential . This sharply-thresholded function is convolved with a Gaussian noise kernel (H § P I R Q ), which reflects the intrinsic processing noise of biological neurons. This produces a less discontinuous deterministic function with a softer threshold that is better suited for graded learning mechanisms (e.g., gradient descent).
k-Winners-Take-All Inhibition
Leabra uses a kWTA function to achieve sparse distributed representations (c.f., Minai & Levy, 1994) . Thus, the inhibition is placed exactly to allow units to be above threshold, and the remainder below threshold. For this version, the S parameter is almost always .25, allowing the £ £ unit to be sufficiently above the inhibitory threshold. We should emphasize that, when membrane potential is at threshold, unit activation in the model = .25; as such, the kWTA algorithm places a firm upper bound on the number of units showing activation > .25, but it does not set an upper bound on the number of weakly active units (i.e., units showing activation between 0 and .25).
Activation dynamics similar to those produced by the kWTA function have been shown to result from simulated inhibitory interneurons that project both feedforward and feedback inhibition (O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000) . Thus, although the kWTA function is somewhat biologically implausible in its implementation (e.g., requiring global information about activation states and using sorting mechanisms), it provides a computationally effective approximation to biologically plausible inhibitory dynamics.
Hebbian Learning
The simplest form of Hebbian learning adjusts the weights in proportion to the product of the sending ( ) and receiving ( § ) unit activations:
, where is the sending layer's expected activation level, and S (called savg cor in the simulator) is the extent to which this sending layer's average activation is fully corrected for (S § gives full correction, and S § yields no correction).
Weight Contrast Enhancement
One limitation of the Hebbian learning algorithm is that the weights linearly reflect the strength of the conditional probability. This linearity can limit the network's ability to focus on only the strongest correlations, while ignoring weaker ones. To remedy this limitation, we introduce a contrast enhancement function that magnifies the stronger weights and shrinks the smaller ones in a parametric, continuous fashion. This contrast enhancement is achieved by passing the linear weight values computed by the learning rule through a sigmoidal nonlinearity of the following form:
where ¤ § is the contrast-enhanced weight value, and the sigmoidal function is parameterized by an offset and a gain (standard defaults of 1.25 and 6, respectively, used here).
Appendix B: Hippocampal Model Details
This section provides a brief summary of key architectural parameters of the hippocampal model. Activity levels, layer size, and projection parameters were set to mirror the "consensus view" of the functional architecture of the hippocampus described, e.g., by Squire, Shimamura, and Amaral (1989) . Table 2 shows the sizes of different hippocampal subregions and their activity levels in the model. These activity levels are enforced by setting appropriate parameters in the Leabra kWTA inhibition function. As discussed in the main text, activity is much more sparse in DG and CA3 than in EC. Table 3 shows the properties of the four modifiable projections in the hippocampal model. For each simulated participant, connection weights in these projections are set to values randomly sampled from a uniform distribution with mean and variance (range) as specified in the table. The "scale" factor listed in the table shows how influential this projection is, relative to other projections coming into the layer, and "percent connectivity" specifies the percentage of units in the sending layer that are connected to each unit in the receiving layer. Relative to the perforant path, the mossy fiber pathway is sparse (i.e., each CA3 neuron receives a much smaller number of mossy fiber synapses than perforant path synapses) and strong (i.e., a given mossy fiber synapse has a much larger impact on CA3 unit activation than a given perforant path synapse). The CA3 recurrents and the Schaffer collaterals projecting from CA3 to CA1 are relatively diffuse, so that each CA3 neuron and each CA1 neuron receive a large number of inputs sampled from the entire CA3 population.
The connections linking EC in to CA1, and from CA1 to EC out, are not modified in the course of the simulated memory experiment. Rather, we pre-train these connections so they form an invertible mapping, whereby the CA1 representation resulting from a given EC in pattern is capable of re-creating that same pattern on EC out. CA1 is arranged into eight columns (consisting of 80 units apiece); each column receives input from three slots in EC in and projects back to the corresponding three slots in EC out. See O'Reilly and for discussion of why CA1 is structured in columns. Lastly, our model incorporates the claim, set forth by Michael Hasselmo and his colleagues, that the hippocampus has two functional "modes": an encoding mode, where CA1 activity is primarily driven by EC in, and a retrieval mode, where CA1 activity is primarily driven by stored memory traces in CA3 (e.g., Hasselmo & Wyble, 1997); recently, Hasselmo, Bodelon, and Wyble (2002) presented evidence that these two modes are linked to different phases of the hippocampal theta rhythm. While we find the "theta rhythm" hypothesis to be compelling, we decided to implement the two modes in a much simpler way -specifically, we set the scaling factor for the EC in to CA1 projection to a large value (6) at study, and we set the scaling factor to zero at test. This manipulation captures the essential difference between the two modes without adding unnecessary complexity to the model. Hippo savg cor 1 For those interested in exploring the model in more detail, it can be obtained by sending email to the first author.
